All three horizons move from Buy / Hold to SELL, and the cause is a valuation error we are correcting, not something the company did. Take-Two reported Q1 FY2027 on 7 August, reiterated its record $8.0–8.2bn fiscal-2027 net-bookings outlook, reaffirmed Grand Theft Auto VI for 19 November 2026 in an SEC filing, and the shares rose 6% on the day and 2.0% since our last report. Nothing in that is bearish.
What changed is the analysis. The previous report priced this name off a synthetic multiple
— a blend of a stub year and a future year that landed at 25.5×, half a point beneath the 26× Communication Services guardrail. An
earlier version of this report then withdrew the valuation anchor altogether (val_band: "na") on the argument that no clean
multiple resolves. An independent audit rejected that, correctly: the framework allows the skip only for a pre-revenue explorer or a negative-EBITDA
trough, and Take-Two has fifteen analysts publishing forward earnings and its own EBITDA guidance. Computed properly, the current-year
multiple is 36.42× against a warranted 19.15× — a ratio of 1.90, and 40% above the sector guardrail. That is the Expensive
band on two independent legs, which fires Gate 3 and takes the decision matrix from Medium quality × Fair to
Medium quality × Expensive → SELL.
We would rather publish an uncomfortable correction than a comfortable number. The rating is a statement about the price, not a prediction that the game will fail — the driver score is 80, the highest of the five pillars.
Take-Two Interactive publishes and develops video games through three labels: Rockstar Games (Grand Theft Auto, Red Dead Redemption), 2K (NBA 2K, WWE 2K, Borderlands, BioShock, Civilization) and Zynga, its mobile arm (Toon Blast, Match Factory!, Empires & Puzzles, Words With Friends). It sells games outright on PlayStation, Xbox, PC and mobile, and then earns the larger share of its money afterwards — 84% of last quarter's net bookings came from recurrent consumer spending, meaning virtual currency, add-on content, in-game purchases and advertising inside games people already own. What sets the company apart is the quality of what it owns rather than how much of it there is: Grand Theft Auto is arguably the most valuable intellectual property in interactive entertainment, its last instalment has sold more than 215 million copies, and NBA 2K holds the exclusive basketball simulation licence. The trade-off is concentration and cadence — Rockstar releases a major title roughly once a decade, so the company's earnings arrive in enormous, infrequent waves rather than a steady stream. Grand Theft Auto VI is scheduled for 19 November 2026.
hard_gate_state: caution.Lifecycle & sector: GICS Communication Services — Interactive Home Entertainment (Yahoo/GICS; FMP's profile mis-labels the sector "Technology", which we do not use). Lifecycle stage Growth, pre-inflection: fiscal-2027 net bookings are guided to a record $8.0–8.2bn (+19–22% on FY26's $6.72bn), but essentially all of the step-up arrives with one title in one quarter — Grand Theft Auto VI on 19 November 2026. The correct lens is therefore net bookings, recurrent consumer spending and non-GAAP EBITDA, not GAAP earnings, which are loss-making because of purchase-accounting amortisation from the 2022 Zynga deal, deferred-revenue accounting, and pre-launch spend. Scoring this business on trailing P/E or ROE would be the classic wrong-lens error — but the reverse error, scoring it on a fiscal year that has not happened, is just as wrong, and it is the one we have corrected this run.
| Sub-signal (sector-appropriate) | Value (source) | Context vs sector / own history | Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net-bookings trajectory | FY26 $6.72bn (+19% on $5.65bn); FY27 guided $8.0–8.2bn, reiterated 7 Aug. But Q1 FY27 bookings fell 3% to $1.39bn, and recurrent consumer spending fell 1% | A two-year ~20% bookings CAGR is top-quartile for a console publisher (sector median ~5%). The offset is real: the base business is flat-to-shrinking and the whole step-up is one title | 65 |
| Profitability vs peers | TTM GAAP operating margin −2.4%, net margin −4.8%, gross margin 56.0%. Q1 non-GAAP EBITDA $167.0m = 12.0% of bookings; FY27 guided EBITDA margin 12.6% | Bottom-quartile. Electronic Arts ran high-20s operating margins pre-buyout; Nintendo mid-30s; NetEase high-20s. TTWO's 56% gross margin is well below the 70–80% software norm — mobile user-acquisition and platform fees sit in cost of revenue | 40 |
| Cash generation | TTM FCF ~$326m (operating cash flow $500m less capex $174m, from FMP per-share ratios) = 4.9% of bookings. FY27 guided OCF >$1.0bn, capex ~$290m ⇒ ~$710m forward | Thin for a $46bn company — a 0.7% trailing FCF yield on enterprise value. Improving, but the improvement is the launch, not the run-rate. (Yahoo reports $1.26bn FCF on a different definition; we use the reconcilable FMP figure and flag the gap in §15) | 45 |
| Balance-sheet health | Cash $1.83bn, debt $2.94bn, net debt $1.12bn. Net debt / FY27 guided EBITDA ~1.1×; EBITDA / interest 10.6× (TTM EBITDA $986m over gross interest expense of $93.2m — the sum of the four quarterly interestExpense lines from get_income_statement: $30.4m + $28.2m + $17.1m + $17.5m. Q1 also reported $22.8m of interest income, so net interest expense is lower still and the conclusion is unchanged either way). Current ratio 1.06; debt/equity 0.82 | Comfortable — it funds the launch run-up without a raise. The current ratio is thin but the company is not liquidity-constrained. See the §2 note on the GAAP interest-coverage artefact | 58 |
| Recurrent-revenue mix (sector-specific) | Recurrent consumer spending = 84% of Q1 net bookings (78% for FY26) | Top-tier for a console publisher — this is the single best quality attribute in the business and the reason a GTA VI cycle is an annuity rather than a one-off unit sale | 75 |
| Release-slate depth (sector-specific) | Dated: NBA 2K27 (4 Sep 2026), GTA VI (19 Nov 2026). Undated: PGA TOUR 2K27, WWE 2K27, Judas, Project ETHOS, next BioShock, Zynga's Top Goal and CSR 3 | Two dated titles and a long TBA tail; one unannounced third-party title was cancelled this quarter ($43.4m impairment). Visibility beyond GTA VI is thin | 55 |
| ROIC / ROE (trailing) | ROE −9.0%, ROA −0.6%; GAAP ROIC negative. On FY27 guided GAAP net income ($104–143m) ROIC is ~2–3%; on a management basis ~14% | Below cost of capital on any trailing measure, and has been for four years. The gap between the two forward readings is exactly how much of this business's "returns" are an accounting artefact you have to take on trust | 38 |
FY27 guided bookings growth +20.5% (midpoint $8.1bn on FY26's $6.72bn) plus the guided non-GAAP EBITDA margin 12.6% ($1,023m midpoint) = 33.1. That is below the 40 line. Run the same test on consensus FY28 — the first full Grand Theft Auto VI year — and it improves to roughly 13% growth + ~26% margin ≈ 39: better, still not elite. Rating: PASSES ON GROWTH, FAILS ON MARGIN. Benchmark score 60/100. The honest read is that even at post-launch scale this is a good, not exceptional, composite — the margin leg is structurally capped by mobile user-acquisition costs and a decade of Zynga amortisation.
Moat composite = 65/100 — carried almost entirely by the intellectual property. Strip out the 90 on intangibles and the remaining four dimensions average 58. The walls are one wall.
Take-Two does not compete for the Grand Theft Auto customer — there is no substitute product — so the franchise itself is not under share attack. It competes for engagement hours and discretionary wallet, and on that axis the trend is not in its favour: Fortnite, Roblox, Call of Duty and EA Sports FC have spent eight years training players to spend inside live-service economies, and by Bank of America's assessment the current GTA Online monetises below all four. The competitive question for this stock is therefore not "will someone build a better GTA" but "can Rockstar close a monetisation gap its rivals opened while it was in development" — and the answer is unknown until the game ships. Two structural changes landed this quarter. Electronic Arts completed its $55bn take-private on 4 August 2026 (PIF 93.4% / Silver Lake 5.5% / Affinity 1.1%) — a rival with a sovereign balance sheet and no quarterly reporting obligation can now spend through cycles in a way a listed Take-Two cannot. And Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 4 moved to 23 October 2026, explicitly to clear the November window — a competitive compliment, and confirmation that the whole industry is pricing GTA VI as the event of the cycle. Net: share trajectory stable, threat level moderate.
| Named direct competitor | Threat type | Share trajectory (TTWO vs rival) | Moat-erosion vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| Electronic Arts (private since 4 Aug 2026) | The direct merchant rival — EA Sports FC / Madden vs NBA 2K and WWE 2K; Battlefield vs Rockstar's action titles | Stable — genre overlap is limited (EA owns football, 2K owns basketball and wrestling), and NBA 2K had a record FY26 | Cost advantage. A $55bn sponsor-owned EA can out-spend on development and user acquisition without a quarterly margin constraint. This is the main reason Cost Advantage is scored 45, not 60 |
| Microsoft / Activision Blizzard | Call of Duty (action-shooter attention), King (mobile vs Zynga), Game Pass (subscription bundling vs the $80 premium unit) | Stable, with a favourable near-term move — Modern Warfare 4 was pushed to 23 Oct 2026 to avoid the GTA VI window | Pricing power. Game Pass normalises "all games for $20 a month", which is the long-run argument against an $80 SKU. Not yet visible in Take-Two's numbers |
| Epic Games (Fortnite) and Roblox | The real competition — free-to-play platforms that own the teenage engagement hour and monetise it better | Stable in product share, losing in share of engagement hours — Take-Two's recurrent spending fell 1% in Q1 while these platforms grew. The calibration's competitive_share_trajectory: "stable" is a product- and revenue-share read across the whole competitive set; this row is the one place the engagement-hours read is negative, and it is the reason Switching Costs is scored 48 | Switching costs. This is the specific evidence behind the 48: a player's hours and wallet are the scarce resource and the incumbents in that fight are not Take-Two |
| Netflix Games (and streaming generally) | Attention substitution — the same evening, a different screen | Stable; and note the irony that Netflix is simultaneously the exclusive premiere partner for the 27 Aug "Extended Look" | Low, and partly offset — the distribution partnership is a marketing asset this cycle |
| Mobile puzzle/social publishers (Playtika, Scopely, Dream Games, Moon Active) | Direct rivals to Zynga's Toon Blast, Match Factory!, Empires & Puzzles and Color Block Jam | Mixed — Toon Blast +8%, Words With Friends +8%, Top Eleven +15%, but Color Block Jam comparisons are "challenging" | Cost advantage. Management named the vector explicitly on the call: rivals "vastly overspending in user acquisition" can crowd Take-Two out of profitable installs |
Net effect on the moat: Switching Costs trimmed to 48 (the monetisation gap versus Fortnite / CoD / EA FC is evidence of decaying lock-in, not of it); Cost Advantage trimmed to 45 (a sovereign-funded private EA plus mobile user-acquisition inflation on a 56% gross margin). Both propagate: they are the named trigger in the §11 Bear case and the competitive invalidation condition in §12. competitive_share_trajectory: stable · competitive_threat_level: moderate.
| Component | Read | Score |
|---|---|---|
| ROIC (40%) | Negative on trailing GAAP. On FY27 guided GAAP net income of $104–143m against roughly $4.7bn of invested capital, ~2–3%; on a management basis (non-GAAP EBITDA less non-intangible D&A, taxed at 18%) ~14%. Unmeasurable cleanly until the launch year is in the accounts | 45 |
| Capital allocation (30%) | The $12.7bn Zynga acquisition (2022) has since carried a ~$3.6bn impairment (Q4 FY25) — documented value destruction on the largest capital decision management has made. This quarter added a $43.4m write-off on a cancelled third-party title. Against that: no dividend, negligible buybacks, debt held at ~1.1× EBITDA, and a genuine willingness to delay a title twice rather than ship it unfinished | 45 |
| Management skin in the game (30%) | Stock-based compensation runs ~$86m a quarter, roughly 4.3% of FY27 guided bookings — well inside the 25% red-flag line. But on 10 August 2026, three days after the print and near the local high, trusts related to Chairman and CEO Strauss Zelnick sold 40,000 shares at $250.49–255.05 (~$10.1m) and gifted a further 20,000 (Form 4 filed 11 Aug, accession 0000946581-26-000069). The filing carries no Rule 10b5-1 plan designation. One insider is not a Do-Not-Buy trigger — that needs three — but selling into strength three months before the largest launch in company history is a datapoint, not noise | 42 |
Weighted = 0.40×45 + 0.30×45 + 0.30×42 = 44.1/100.
Universal sub-signals (bookings 65, profitability 40, cash 45, balance sheet 58) average 52, weighted 30%.
Sector-specific (recurrent mix 75, slate 55) = 65, weighted 12%. Industry benchmark 60, weighted 18%.
Moat 65, weighted 25%. ROIC / capital / alignment 44.1, weighted 15%.
0.30×52 + 0.12×65 + 0.18×60 + 0.25×65 + 0.15×44.1 = 57.
A correction to how this cut was explained. An earlier draft attributed the 70→57 move to the
competitive moat trims, the capital-allocation cut and "acting on FMP's D+ rating". That account does not survive contact with the arithmetic, and
an audit was right to say so. The moat composite moved only 66→65 — pricing power rose 70→78 and intangibles
88→90, all but cancelling the switching-cost and cost-advantage trims — which is −0.25 points at a 25% weight.
Capital allocation and skin-in-the-game together are about −0.6. And FMP's D+ is worth zero: the framework
treats get_ratings_snapshot as a secondary cross-reference carrying a small confidence bonus, not as a Quality input, and no such
deduction appears in the calculation above.
What actually moved it, stated properly. Two things, both methodological and both worth naming:
The genuinely new evidence — which is what should carry a downgrade — is this quarter's numbers, and they support it: Q1 non-GAAP EBITDA fell to $167.0m from $225.5m a year earlier, −26%; cash and equivalents fell from $1,545.5m to $1,364.9m; and the current ratio slipped from 1.24 to 1.06. Net bookings fell 3% and recurrent consumer spending fell 1%. That is a business consuming resources into its launch, which is expected — but it is deterioration in the reported period, and it is the honest basis for marking profitability, cash generation and the balance sheet down.
This remains the hinge of the report. Quality sits eight points below the 65 "High" threshold. With Valuation in the Expensive band (see §4), the decision matrix reads Medium quality × Expensive valuation → SELL. Had Quality cleared 65, the same valuation would have produced High × Expensive → HOLD (great business, wrong price). So this eight-point gap is the difference between Hold and Sell, and the reader is entitled to see exactly that. A clean post-launch FY2028 on consensus — net income ~$1.9bn, EBITDA margin ~26%, ROIC ~14% — would very probably lift Quality through 65. That is falsifiable and dated: the first two quarters of GTA VI revenue, reported February and May 2027.
A correction, stated plainly. The previous draft of this report withdrew the valuation anchor
(val_band: "na") on the argument that no clean multiple resolves. That was wrong, and an independent audit was right to reject it.
The framework permits skipping the anchor only for a pre-revenue explorer or a negative-EBITDA trough. Take-Two is neither: it has
fifteen analysts publishing FY2027 and FY2028 earnings estimates and its own guidance for $993–1,053m of non-GAAP EBITDA.
Withdrawing the anchor also silently disabled Gate 3's Expensive arm and Do-Not-Buy Trigger 2. The anchor is computed below and its
consequences are carried through the decision matrix — including to a SELL, which is where they lead.
| Anchor input | Value | Derivation |
|---|---|---|
| Risk-free rate | 4.70% | The 10-year Treasury carried in the 12 August 2026 macro report — the report the Economic-Alignment pillar consumes, which is what the framework specifies. The fresher FRED DGS10 print of 13 August is 4.63%; we use the higher, less favourable figure and show below that the conclusion is unchanged at either |
| Equity risk premium | 4.50% | The framework's single global constant — not a per-sector knob |
| Risk add-on | +1.00% | Business Quality is 57, inside the 40–64 band. (Beta is 0.98 and this is a large cap, so neither escalation applies) |
| Discount rate r | 10.20% | 4.70 + 4.50 + 1.00 |
| g_near (years 1–5) | 10.0% | Consensus EPS runs $6.78 (FY27) → $12.02 (FY31), a four-year CAGR of 15.39%. Haircut by 25% ⇒ 11.54%, then capped at the 10% cyclical/legacy Communication Services line. The cap binds |
| g_term (year 6+) | 3.0% | Long-run nominal GDP; must be below r |
| Warranted P/E | 19.15× | Two-stage: Σt=1..5((1.10/1.1020)t) = 4.97, plus a terminal value of 14.18. Below the 26× sector guardrail, so the cap does not bind |
| Earnings basis | Actual P/E at $246.95 | ÷ warranted 19.15× | vs the 26× Communication Services guardrail | Band |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2027 — the current fiscal year (ends 31 Mar 2027), consensus EPS $6.78 (n=15) | 36.42× | 1.90 | Breached — 36.42 ≥ 26 | EXPENSIVE |
| FY2028 — the first full launch year, consensus EPS $9.99 (n=15) | 24.72× | 1.29 | Not breached — 24.72 < 26 | Full |
The band is set on FY2027, and the choice is the most consequential judgement in this report — so here is the reasoning in full. FY2027 is the fiscal year currently in progress: it began on 1 April 2026 and we are four and a half months into it. The conventional forward P/E, and the multiple an investor actually pays today, is the current-year one. The framework's anchor scores the actual clean multiple against what rates and disciplined growth warrant; reaching past the current year to FY2028 credits two years of growth for free, which is the "feed the hype growth" move the framework explicitly bans. And there is a plainer test: FY2028 is the only year of the five under estimate that sits beneath the 26× guardrail. Selecting it would be selecting the year that produces the more comfortable answer — the exact defect the audit found in the previous draft, which used FY2027 for one field and FY2028 for another. Both readings are shown above and neither supports a purchase: on the current year the name is Expensive, on next year it is Full. Nothing in the estimate set reads Attractive.
Two arms fire, and each is independently sufficient. The ratio arm: 1.90 is well past the 1.40 Expensive threshold. The guardrail arm (step 5b): at or above the sector line the name is Expensive regardless of the warranted ratio, with no growth exception — and 36.42× is 40% above the 26× line. Either alone would do it.
But be precise about what that independence buys, because it is easy to overstate. The two arms are independent of each other given the earnings year — they are not independent of the year. Both read off the same $6.78 figure, and on FY2028 both fail together: the ratio drops to 1.29 and 24.72× falls under the 26× line. The sensitivity analysis below varies the discount rate and the growth cap, and the verdict survives every combination — but it does not vary the year, which is the one input that flips the answer. That is why the choice of FY2027 is described above as the most consequential judgement in this report, and why the FY2028 reading is shown alongside it rather than buried.
Sensitivity — the verdict does not depend on a debatable input. At the alternative 4.63% risk-free the warranted multiple rises to 19.34× and the ratio is 1.88 — still Expensive. If Take-Two were treated as secular-growth Communication Services and allowed the 15% growth cap rather than 10%, warranted rises to 23.40× and the ratio is still 1.56 — still Expensive, and the guardrail arm fires regardless of growth. There is no defensible parameter set inside this framework that makes the current-year multiple anything other than Expensive.
Because the name is now in the Expensive band, Trigger 2 must be tested rather than skipped. Both arms are checked and both fail, and the margins are stated so the reader can see how close it is:
So the outcome is a SELL from the base decision matrix, not a hard Do-Not-Buy. The distinction matters: this is a name the framework says is priced above what its rates-and-growth fundamentals warrant, not one where buying has structurally negative expected value.
| Lens | Value | Reference | Score | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| THE ANCHOR — actual ÷ warranted | 36.42× ÷ 19.15× = 1.90 | Deep in the Expensive band (≥1.40), and independently above the 26× sector guardrail. This lens is supreme — the relative lenses below can order the name within the band but cannot lift it out | 12 | 40% |
| Sector median / cash yield | EV $47.29bn ÷ FY27 guided net bookings $8.1bn = 5.84×. TTM FCF ~$326m ÷ EV = 0.7%; on FY27 guided (>$1.0bn operating cash flow less ~$290m capex) ~1.5% | Electronic Arts was taken private on 4 Aug 2026 at $55bn ÷ $8.026bn FY26 net bookings = 6.85×. Take-Two is below it — but that is an equity price against our enterprise multiple, so like-for-like the gap is narrower than 5.84 vs 6.85 suggests. The FCF yield sits below the framework's "1–3% expensive" band entirely | 45 | 20% |
| Own-history decile | Trailing EV / sales 7.07× | Upper decile of its own five-year range (~3.9× in early 2023, 5.3× in 2024, 6.1× in early 2026). Decile 8. On forward bookings the 5.84× is mid-range — both are shown | 30 | 15% |
| Growth-adjusted (PEG) | 36.42× ÷ the 15.4% four-year consensus EPS CAGR = 2.4 | Above 2 is expensive on any conventional reading. And the growth is front-loaded into one year: consensus runs $6.78 → $9.99 → $10.83 → $12.01 → $12.02, so from FY2028 onward the CAGR is 6.4% — one enormous year, then a plateau | 25 | 10% |
| Analyst consensus (targets 10% + grades 5%) | Mean $287.11, median $290.00, high $368, low $170, n=29 (Yahoo); FMP's narrower recent panel $291.30. Price is 16.3% below the mean. Grades: 45 Buy / 12 Hold / 0 Sell = 78.9% bullish | This is the one lens that argues the other way, and it is weighted accordingly. Note the contrarian caveat the framework requires: zero sell ratings on a name whose entire case rests on one unshipped product is one-sided positioning, not independent confirmation | 75 | 15% |
Weighted = 0.40×12 + 0.20×45 + 0.15×30 + 0.10×25 + 0.15×75 = 4.8 + 9.0 + 4.5 + 2.5 + 11.25 = 32.05, plus a +3 embedded-optionality tilt (the low end of the permitted +3 to +8, because a demonstrably expensive core earns less credit for free upside) = 35. The weights sum to 1.00. Valuation = 35 — Expensive. The framework is explicit that optionality "must never turn an expensive core into Attractive on hope alone", so the tilt operates strictly inside the band.
Run the anchor backwards. Solving the same two-stage formula for the growth rate that would make 36.42× the warranted multiple at r = 10.20% with a 3% terminal fade gives 26.7% a year for five years. (Cross-check: at 26.65% the formula returns 36.42×; at 22% it returns only 30.64×.) Set that against the three growth rates this report has established: the framework's disciplined estimate is 10% (the sector cap, itself below the 11.5% a 25% haircut to consensus would allow), the consensus FY2027–FY2031 EPS CAGR is 15.4%, and the sell side's own post-FY2028 plateau rate is 6.4%. So the price embeds roughly 2.7× the framework's disciplined growth, 1.7× what consensus models across the whole estimate horizon, and 4.2× the rate consensus expects once the launch year has passed. An earlier draft put this at "roughly 22%", which understated it — the error ran against the conclusion drawn here, and is corrected upward.
The fair-value estimate carried into the §12 entry rules is $191: the warranted 19.15× applied to FY2028 consensus EPS of $9.99. That reaches to the very year this section declines to set the band on, and the reason given there was that FY2028 "credits two years of growth for free". The asymmetry is real and here is the justification. The band answers "what am I paying today?", so it must use the year in progress. The fair value feeds a forward-looking entry rule — a level at which the shares would become buyable over the next twelve months — by which point FY2028 is the operative earnings year. Applying the same warranted multiple to FY2027 gives 19.15 × $6.78 = $130. We publish the more generous of the two, and note that it changes nothing: at $246.95 the Fundamental entry group closes on either figure, by 29% against $191 and by 90% against $130.
Four things are not in the guided numbers: the PC edition of GTA VI, undated and unmentioned on the 7 August call (GTA V's PC release came 18 months after console and became a large share of lifetime units); GTA Online VI as an annuity, the layer that turned GTA V into a decade of income and which is 84% of current bookings; in-game advertising, which management declined to detail and which is the largest un-monetised attention surface in entertainment; and Deluxe-edition mix on an $80 standard price the market has absorbed.
All four are genuine. The tilt applied is nonetheless only +3, at the bottom of the permitted range, and it is worth being explicit about why: when the core business is priced at 1.90× what its own rates and growth warrant, free optionality is the reason to keep watching, not the reason the stock is cheap. If the anchor read Fair, this optionality would be a genuine argument for owning it. At 36× the current year it is a cushion on a price that has already spent it.
FMP's independent health snapshot rates Take-Two D+ (overall 1 of 5) with every sub-score at 1. It is a mechanical read off trailing GAAP, which is the wrong lens for this business, and the framework treats it as a secondary cross-reference worth a +3 confidence bonus — not as an input to any pillar score, and it is not used as one here. It is noted because it points the same way as our own Medium/Expensive readings rather than against them.
Take-Two has one driver and it has a date on it: the Grand Theft Auto VI product cycle. No external commodity, rate or macro variable comes close — the identity of this company over the next three years is set by how one title launches on 19 November 2026 and how its online economy performs afterwards. The secondary driver is discretionary entertainment spend, which is currently deteriorating.
| Horizon | Assessment | Evidence (source, date) | Score | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Historical | The last cycle was extraordinary and unusually durable — Grand Theft Auto V has sold 215m+ lifetime units and its online economy generated revenue for a decade. Set against that: GTA VI has been delayed twice, from 2025 to May 2026 and then to 19 November 2026 (announced November 2025, which took the stock down sharply) | Company disclosure; the 6 Nov 2025 8-K and subsequent reporting | 78 | 25% |
| Current | The date is reaffirmed in a primary filing this cycle. Pre-orders are described by the CEO as "exceptional" with a satisfactory edition mix — though he cautioned they "remain cancelable" and "we just don't know how it will translate into sales". The $80 standard price point has been absorbed. Activision moved Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 4 to 23 October to clear the window | SEC Form 8-K, exhibit 99.1, filed 7 Aug 2026, accession 0001628280-26-054580: "excitement around the November 19th launch of Grand Theft Auto VI"; the future-lineup table lists "Grand Theft Auto VI — PS5, Xbox Series X|S — November 19, 2026". Q1 FY27 call, 7 Aug 2026 | 85 | 50% |
| Forward | FY2027 net bookings guidance of $8.0–8.2bn reiterated; consensus FY2028 revenue $9.16bn and net income $1.94bn. The unknowns are genuinely unknown: sell-through, review reception, launch technical quality, and whether GTA Online VI closes the monetisation gap to Fortnite and EA FC. The consumer backdrop is weakening (July retail sales −0.6%, Michigan sentiment 51.0) | 8-K 7 Aug 2026; FMP analyst estimates (n=15 for FY28); US economic calendar 14 Aug 2026 | 74 | 25% |
Driver score = 0.25×78 + 0.50×85 + 0.25×74 = 80 / 100 — Strong Tailwind (previously 78).
Not a commodity-linked name, so no price-trend overlay applies; driver_commodity_trend is recorded as not applicable.
At 80 the driver is comfortably above the 65 threshold, so it is eligible to lift a base BUY to STRONG BUY. It does not fire, and it could not: amplification only ever intensifies the direction the fundamentals already point. The base signal is SELL, and a SELL amplifies to STRONG SELL only on a driver headwind of 35 or below alongside Headwind economic pressure. A driver of 80 pointing the opposite way to the base signal is recorded as a caveat, explicitly, and is not permitted to soften the signal. Economic pressure is Neutral in any case. The driver does not change the three fundamental pillar scores and has not been used to.
This is the single most important sentence in the report, so it is worth stating plainly: the driver is excellent and the signal is SELL. That is not a contradiction, it is the framework working: a superb, dated catalyst attached to a Medium-quality business at a price 1.90× what its rates and growth warrant produces a Sell, because the framework will not let a story override the multiple. If you want one sentence for why this report reads as it does — the game is not the question, the price is.
The level at which the whole case breaks is not a share price — it is a date. A slip of Grand Theft Auto VI out of the 19 November window would remove roughly $1.6–2.0bn of FY2027 bookings, push the entire earnings inflection into FY2028–29, and re-rate the multiple on a franchise that has now missed three times. That is the floor — and it is the dominant trigger in the §11 bear case at $168. Watch it on 27 August: a polished, dated, content-rich "Extended Look" is confirmation; a vague one, or silence, is not.
Driver confidence 62%: base 70, less 8 because the magnitude of the outcome is genuinely unquantifiable before launch — management itself declined to guide unit sales, the recurrent-spending contribution or the Deluxe mix.
Take-Two is not carried in the macro report's Economic Watchlist Forecast, so its economic read comes from the Driver-Sector Impact Matrix for its GICS sector, Communication Services (XLC): Underperform short / Neutral medium / Neutral long. Anchoring on the medium horizon, as the framework requires, the pressure is Neutral and the stance is therefore Neutral with conviction 45 — macro is not a material swing factor for this name, and saying so is more useful than manufacturing a view.
The regime described in the 12 August macro report is energy-shock stagflation: a supply-driven inflation impulse hitting a contracting labour market, with Fed cuts priced out (2-Y 4.22% against 3.63% funds) and a live hike-versus-hold debate. The short-horizon Underperform on XLC is worth noting because the consumer data underneath it is genuinely poor — July retail sales −0.6% against +0.1% expected, Michigan sentiment 51.0 against 54.5, July payrolls −23k. Against that, an $80 game is a small, unfinanced purchase, the sector has historically been resilient in weak consumer environments, and management stated plainly on the 7 August call that they are not seeing a slowdown in their own mobile numbers.
Effect on the signal: none. Amplification requires pressure of Tailwind (for STRONG BUY) or Headwind (for STRONG SELL). Neutral pressure enables neither, so the base signal stands unchanged on all three horizons — and in any case the base signal is HOLD, which the framework never amplifies. The 10-Y Treasury of 4.63% (FRED DGS10, 13 Aug 2026) taken from this same report is the risk-free rate used in the §4 reference discount-rate calculation.
Source: sector-map (XLC) · Macro report 2026-08-12
Timing is the pillar that moved most this run, and for a specific reason: on 31 July the name sat inside a seven-day earnings blackout with zero open entry paths. Take-Two reported on 7 August before the open, the stock closed +6.04% at $246.50 on 2.12× its 20-day average volume, ran to $253.57 the following session, and has since consolidated. The blackout is gone, the reaction was confirmatory, and the next earnings date is 82 days away. Timing rises from 54 to 64 — and it is worth saying at the outset that a better tape does not rescue this name, because the decision matrix at Medium quality and an Expensive valuation returns SELL on any timing score at all.
| Element | Level | Read |
|---|---|---|
| Current price | $246.95 (14 Aug close) | Above the 20-day ($241.70), 50-day ($237.86) and 200-day ($229.04) moving averages |
| Logical stop | $228 | Below the 228.20 / 228.50 / 230.67 swing-low cluster and just under weekly support at 227.25. Distance $18.95 = 2.30 ATR (ATR-14 = $8.24, 3.34% of price) ⇒ the "moderate" 1.5–2.5 ATR band, score 50 |
| Proximity penalty | −15 | Nearest daily resistance is $248.46, only 0.6% above the price. Entering within 3% of resistance is a poor entry location by the framework's own rule |
| Freshness bonus | +5 | The last swing low was 6 August (six sessions ago) and it was reclaimed on 2.1× volume — a fresh, volume-confirmed low rather than a 30-day-old move being chased |
| Reward | Base $240 (−2.8%), bull $332 (+34.4%) | The §11 base case, rebuilt on the corrected valuation anchor, now sits below the current price. Risk to the stop is −7.7% against a base case of −2.8%, so there is no favourable reward-to-risk ratio to credit — the upside lives entirely in the 25%-weighted bull tail |
Risk-reward sub-score = 50 (stop at 2.30 ATR, the moderate band) − 15 (entry within 3% of resistance) + 5 (fresh, volume-confirmed swing low) = 40. An earlier draft printed 48 by adding an unexplained 8-point credit for a reward-to-risk ratio that, on the corrected base case, does not exist.
| Window | TTWO | SPY | XLC (sector) | Read |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 month (17 Jul → 14 Aug) | +4.34% | +4.45% | +2.08% | In line with the index, +2.3pp ahead of the sector |
| 3 months (15 May → 14 Aug) | +1.86% | +5.03% | −2.70% | −3.2pp behind the index, +4.6pp ahead of the sector |
"Outperforming one benchmark, in line with / behind the other" ⇒ the 65–84 band; scored 68. 52-week range position: $246.95 sits 75.7% of the way up a $187.63–$265.94 band — upper-middle, 7.1% below the 7 July high. Note the lower-high sequence: $265.94 (7 Jul) → $256.62 (10 Aug). The trend is up; the highs are not yet. Comparisons use total-return series, which is the only legitimate use for them; every price-versus-moving-average test in this report uses raw unadjusted closes. Take-Two pays no dividend, so the two are identical here in any case.
The 12 August macro report describes an energy-shock stagflation regime: a supply-driven inflation impulse into a contracting labour market, with Fed cuts priced out (2-Y at 4.22% against a 3.63% funds rate) and a live hike-versus-hold debate. Yesterday's data fits: July retail sales −0.6% against +0.1% expected, Michigan sentiment 51.0 against 54.5, July payrolls −23k against +80k. That is an unambiguously weak consumer, and Communication Services is rated Underperform on the short horizon. Against it: an $80 game is a low-ticket purchase with no financing attached, and management said flatly on the call that they are not seeing a macro slowdown in their own numbers ("No, it's really not what we're seeing"). Games have historically been resilient in weak consumer environments. Scored 38 — a real headwind, correctly weighted small.
| Signal | Reading | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Analyst grade actions (last 30 days) | Seven maintains dated 10 August, three days after the print: Oppenheimer (Outperform), BTIG (Buy), Wells Fargo (Overweight), Roth Capital (Buy), DA Davidson (Buy), Wedbush (Outperform) and Baird (Outperform). No upgrades and no downgrades. The framework's reading of an all-maintain set is 40–64 — scored at the top of that band because maintaining a Buy-equivalent immediately after results is a mild positive, not indifference. An earlier draft of this report wrongly recorded this as a data gap and applied a confidence penalty for it; the tool does return these actions and the penalty has been removed. | 60 |
| Grades distribution | 45 Buy / 12 Hold / 0 Sell — 78.9% bullish, recommendation mean 1.19 | 74 |
| Estimate revisions | Bookings guidance reiterated at $8.0–8.2bn; the last-month target average ($292.57) sits above the last-quarter average ($289.92), so targets are drifting up. FY27 GAAP EPS guidance of $0.55–0.75 is a low bar, but that is deferral accounting, not a downgrade | 70 |
| News tone | Positive and dense: record pre-orders (24 June announcement), a +6% earnings reaction, the 27 August "Extended Look" with a Netflix exclusive premiere. Negative: the CEO-linked trust sales on 10 August into the post-print high | 62 |
| Positioning caveat | Zero sell ratings and a "strong buy" mean on a single-catalyst name is crowded, one-sided positioning — the framework treats consensus extremes as a mild contrarian flag | 55 |
Sentiment sub-score 64.
| Date | Catalyst | Impact | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| 27 Aug 2026 | Grand Theft Auto VI: An Extended Look — Netflix exclusive premiere 3pm ET, Rockstar YouTube and the GTA VI site 9pm ET | High | 12 days out. The last comparable event — the 24 June pre-order announcement — moved the stock materially. This is the event this report is scheduled around |
| 4 Sep 2026 | NBA 2K27 launch (PS5, Xbox Series X|S, Switch 2, PC) | Medium-high | The largest revenue contributor in the current base; NBA 2K had a record FY26 |
| 5 Nov 2026 | Q2 FY2027 earnings (consensus EPS $0.90 on a management basis, revenue $1.61bn) | High | Note the two bases do not conflict: the company guides Q2 to a GAAP loss of $(0.84)–$(0.75) per share, while the $0.90 consensus is struck on management-basis earnings, which recognise net bookings in the period rather than deferring them. The gap is the deferral, not a disagreement. Expectations are already set low |
| 19 Nov 2026 | Grand Theft Auto VI launch — PS5 and Xbox Series X|S, $80 standard edition | Binary | 96 days out — just outside the 1–3 month short-term window, squarely inside the medium. See §2 Gate 5 |
Catalyst clustering score 55 — one clear high-impact event inside 14 days and a second inside 21. Not chaotic, so no position-size reduction is mandated, but stops should be respected around 27 August. The catalyst layer score for timing is 78: a dated, well-understood, mostly favourable calendar is a timing asset, and this is about as clean a catalyst path as a stock ever offers.
Timing = 0.30×78 (multi-timeframe) + 0.20×40 (risk-reward) + 0.10×38 (macro) + 0.20×64 (sentiment) + 0.20×78 (catalysts) = 23.4 + 8.0 + 3.8 + 12.8 + 15.6 = 64 — the "Improving" band. Confidence 70%: base 75, less 5 for the Polygon date-shift that had to be reconstructed against Yahoo (see §15). The earlier 10-point analyst-grades penalty has been removed because the data gap it was based on did not exist.
| Date | Event | Impact | Forecast | Previous | Relevant? | Why |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18 Aug 2026 | Housing Starts / Building Permits (Jul) | High | 1.35m / 1.37m | 1.427m / 1.374m | No | No transmission to interactive entertainment |
| 19 Aug 2026 | FOMC Minutes | High | — | — | ⚠ Medium | Rate path sets the discount rate on a long-duration, back-loaded earnings stream |
| 25 Aug 2026 | CB Consumer Confidence (Aug) | High | — | 90.8 | ⚠ Medium | Discretionary entertainment spend into an $80 launch |
| 26 Aug 2026 | Core PCE Price Index MoM (Jul) | High | 0.3% | 0.1% | ⚠ Medium | The Fed's preferred gauge; a hot print hardens the hike-versus-hold debate |
| 1 Sep 2026 | ISM Manufacturing PMI (Aug) | High | 55.0 | 55.6 | No | Not relevant to this sector |
| 4 Sep 2026 | Non-Farm Payrolls / Unemployment (Aug) | High | +12k / 4.2% | −23k / 4.1% | ⚠ Medium | Consumer health three days after the NBA 2K27 launch and 11 weeks before GTA VI |
| 11 Sep 2026 | CPI (Aug) | High | — | 3.4% YoY | ⚠ Medium | Real-income squeeze is the transmission channel to discretionary spend |
| Date | Event | Actual | Forecast | Surprise | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 Aug 2026 | Non-Farm Payrolls (Jul) | −23k | +80k | −128.8% (below) | Negative — a contracting labour market is the stagflation half of the regime |
| 12 Aug 2026 | CPI YoY (Jul) | 3.4% | 3.4% | In line | Neutral — but 3.4% with negative payrolls is the squeeze itself |
| 12 Aug 2026 | Core CPI YoY (Jul) | 2.5% | 2.5% | In line | Neutral — core is behaving; the headline is energy-driven |
| 13 Aug 2026 | Producer Price Index MoM (Jul) | 0.0% | +0.2% | −100% (below) | Mildly positive — disinflationary at the producer level |
| 14 Aug 2026 | Retail Sales MoM (Jul) | −0.6% | +0.1% | −700% (below) | Negative — the largest consumer miss of the quarter, straight at discretionary spend |
| 14 Aug 2026 | Michigan Consumer Sentiment (Aug) | 51.0 | 54.5 | −6.4% (below) | Negative — sentiment at levels normally seen in recessions |
Take-Two carries low macro sensitivity (10% weight inside the Timing pillar), so nothing on this calendar overrides the stock-specific catalysts. But the two releases that landed on 14 August — retail sales at −0.6% against +0.1% expected, and Michigan sentiment at 51.0 — are the weakest consumer pairing of the year, and they are the reason the macro sub-score is 38 rather than 50. The honest counterweight is that video games have historically held up in weak consumer environments (an $80 title bought once is cheap entertainment per hour), that management explicitly denied seeing a slowdown on the 7 August call, and that GTA VI is the least price-elastic product this industry has ever released. No high-impact release falls within three trading days, and Take-Two is not a high-macro-sensitivity sector, so no WAIT-for-event override is triggered. The event that actually matters for this stock in the next fortnight is not on this table — it is the 27 August Extended Look.
| Timeframe | Trend | Direction | RSI | MACD | Key S/R | Breakout | Vol |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Monthly | Uptrend ↑ | Bullish | 59.6 | +16.19, histogram −1.41 (fading) | S: $138.93 · R: $264.79 | Resistance breakout | 0.6× |
| Weekly | Uptrend ↑ | Bullish | 57.6 | +6.09, histogram +2.56 (rising) | S: $227.25 · R: $251.34 | Resistance breakout | 1.0× |
| Daily | Strong uptrend ↑ | Bullish | 54.2 | +1.83, histogram +0.16 (5 days positive) | S: $237.86 (SMA50) · R: $248.46 | None — consolidating | 0.53× |
| Hourly | Strong uptrend ↑ | Bullish | 57.2 | +0.88, histogram +0.58 | S: $242.34 · R: $248.97 | Resistance breakout | — |
| 15-minute | Uptrend ↑ | Neutral-bullish | 55.4 | +0.56, histogram +0.01 (flat) | S: $242.20 · R: $247.39 | None | — |
| Confluence: Mostly Bullish · MTF Score 78 | |||||||
Every timeframe points the same way, which is unusual and is the reason Timing rose eleven points. Price at $246.95 sits above its 20-day ($241.70), 50-day ($237.86) and 200-day ($229.04) averages, the 50-day is above the 200-day, and the daily MACD histogram has been positive for five consecutive sessions. Weighted 30/25/25/12/8 across monthly, weekly, daily, hourly and 15-minute, the multi-timeframe score is 78 — Mostly Bullish. The tool's own confluence label reads "strongly bullish"; we score it a notch lower, deliberately, for two reasons.
First, the highs are lower. The 52-week high of $265.94 was set on 7 July; the post-earnings rally stopped at $256.62 on 10 August. Until $256.62 goes, this is a rising series of lows under a falling series of highs — a coil, not a breakout. Second, the volume is not there. Friday's advance came on 1,118,851 shares against a 20-day average of 2,100,212 — 0.53×. That single fact is what keeps the Technical entry group unmet in §12: the framework's breakout branch requires a close above the 50-day on more than 1.5× average volume, and a half-volume advance into resistance is not confirmation.
The monthly MACD histogram has also rolled slightly negative (−1.41) even as the monthly trend stays up — the classic early sign of a long-timeframe move losing momentum, worth nothing on its own and worth watching alongside the lower high. The textbook pattern here is higher-timeframe bullish with price consolidating beneath resistance ahead of a dated catalyst. Support convergence is tight and useful: the 50-day at $237.86, the 13 August low at $239.52 and the rising 20-day at $241.70 cluster within 2%, and beneath them sits the 228.20–230.67 swing-low shelf that defines the stop.
125 daily sessions to the 14 August 2026 close, with the 50-day simple moving average. Rebuilt from correctly-dated Yahoo bars after the Polygon series was found to be shifted one trading day early (see §15); the computed SMA50 of $237.86 reconciles exactly to the independent indicator feed. The February collapse to $189, the March low of $187.63, the recovery through spring, the 7 July high of $265.94 and the 7 August earnings gap from $232.47 to $246.50 are all visible.
Trigger: Grand Theft Auto VI ships on 19 November into the pre-order book the CEO calls "exceptional", sells through at the top of expectations over the holiday, reviews well, and — the part that actually decides this — GTA Online VI closes the monetisation gap to Fortnite, Call of Duty and EA Sports FC. FY2028 EPS beats the $9.99 consensus toward $12, and the market pays a franchise multiple for a proven decade-long annuity rather than for a game.
Anchor: the Electronic Arts take-private, completed 4 August 2026, at $55bn against FY2026 net bookings of $8.026bn = 6.85×. Applying that to FY2028 consensus revenue of ~$9.2bn (net bookings should be similar at scale, though the estimate is struck on revenue): $63.0bn enterprise value, less $1.12bn net debt, over 186.2m shares = $332. Note the comparison flatters us slightly — $55bn is an equity price being set against our enterprise multiple, so like-for-like the discount Take-Two trades at is narrower than it looks. This is the case in which today's price is justified and then some.
Trigger: the game ships on time, FY2027 net bookings land inside the guided $8.0–8.2bn, and FY2028 delivers roughly the consensus $9.16bn of revenue and $9.99 of EPS. GTA Online VI performs respectably without re-rating the franchise, and the earnings plateau consensus already models — $9.99, then $10.83, then $12.01 through FY2031, a 6.4% compound rate — holds.
Anchor: here is the uncomfortable arithmetic at the centre of this report. The earnings arrive and the multiple normalises. At 24× FY2028 EPS of $9.99 — still a full turn above the 19.15× the framework says rates and disciplined growth actually warrant, so this is a generous base — the shares are worth $240, or −2.8% from here. In other words, on the central case you wait fifteen months, get the biggest product launch in the industry's history exactly as promised, and end up roughly where you started, because the launch is already in the price. "Base" here means "the game ships and does fine" — not the midpoint of a smooth distribution.
Three triggers, any one sufficient. (1) The date slips again. The game has already moved twice — out of 2025, then out of May 2026 — and the November 2025 delay took the stock down hard. A third slip removes $1.6–2.0bn of FY2027 bookings and re-rates a franchise that has missed three times. (2) It ships and the online economy disappoints. This is the competitive trigger, named explicitly: Bank of America's own read is that the current GTA Online monetises below Fortnite, Call of Duty and EA Sports FC, and Take-Two's recurrent consumer spending fell 1% in Q1 while those platforms grew. (In fairness, that same note is bullish overall and raised its FY2028 GTA Online bookings estimate by ~$900m — the gap is real, the closing is the open question.) A sovereign-funded private Electronic Arts, free of quarterly margin discipline, makes the gap harder to close. If it persists, FY2028 EPS lands nearer $8 on the warranted 19.15× ⇒ $153. (3) The consumer. July retail sales −0.6%, Michigan sentiment 51.0 and payrolls −23k describe a household that may not absorb an $80 title at the modelled volumes — and pre-orders, in the CEO's own words, "remain cancelable".
We set the bear at $168, between the warranted-multiple floor and the 52-week low of $187.63 — −32.0%. We have deliberately not inherited the macro report's armed AI-concentration de-rating leg: Take-Two's multiple and earnings are not levered to the AI capex trade, and over-firing that tail on "it's a tech stock" is exactly what the framework warns against.
Probability-weighted fair value = 0.55×$240 + 0.25×$332 + 0.20×$168 = $249 — +0.7% against the 14 August close of $246.95. Twelve months, the largest launch in the industry's history, and an expected return of essentially zero, with a spread running from −32% to +34%. That is the case for the Sell in one line: you are being asked to carry a genuinely bimodal, unhedgeable event risk for no expected compensation, because the outcome is already in the price. Our standing fair-value estimate is set at $191 — the warranted multiple of 19.15× applied to FY2028 consensus EPS of $9.99 — which is what the framework says the shares are worth on fundamentals rather than on the scenario weights.
Forecast: Fundamental group — newly closed, and the most important of the three. It failed this run because the corrected anchor puts fair value at $191 against a $246.95 price. Reopening it requires either a 29% fall in the share price, or a rise in warranted fair value — which needs either lower long rates (each 50bp off the 4.70% ten-year lifts the warranted multiple by roughly 1.4 turns, worth about $14 of fair value) or an upgrade to Business Quality that cuts the risk add-on. FORECAST: not before the FY2028 earnings base is visible, i.e. February–May 2027; CONFIDENCE Moderate.
Technical group — open, on two routes. Route A, the volume breakout: a close above the 50-day ($237.86, already true) on more than ~3.15m shares. Volume that heavy has occurred three times in the last month, every time on news — 6 and 7 August (3.99m each) and 10 August (3.78m) — so it is catalyst-dependent, not time-projectable, and the catalyst is dated: the 27 August Extended Look, twelve days out. FORECAST: a genuine possibility on 27–28 August; CONFIDENCE Moderate. Route B, the higher low: a pullback into the $227–232 shelf that holds above $228.20. At the current $8.24 ATR that is ~1.8 ATR away. FORECAST: unlikely inside four weeks absent a negative catalyst; CONFIDENCE Low.
Catalyst group — met, and ageing. The 7 August reaction satisfies all three sub-conditions today; treat it as met through roughly mid-September, then re-earned or lost at the 5 November print.
What would actually change the signal — and it is not the ladder. The signal is SELL because the decision matrix reads Medium quality (57) × Expensive valuation (35). Two distinct routes out, and they can be watched independently. Route 1, valuation: the Expensive band clears when the current-year multiple falls below 1.40× warranted, i.e. below 26.8× — which on FY2027 consensus EPS of $6.78 means a share price under $182, or an upgrade to FY2027 consensus above $9.20. It also clears mechanically on 1 April 2027, when FY2028 becomes the current year and the same $246.95 price is 24.7× rather than 36.4× — below the 26× guardrail. That is not a trick; it is the honest observation that this stock is expensive on the year it is in and merely full on the year after. Route 2, quality: a clean post-launch FY2028 — net income ~$1.9bn, EBITDA margin ~26%, ROIC ~14% — would very probably lift Quality through 65, which turns the same Expensive valuation into High × Expensive → HOLD rather than SELL. FORECAST for both: Q3 FY2027 results, early February 2027; CONFIDENCE Moderate-High if the game ships on time.
Forecast: Stop-loss ($228): 7.7% below the price and below three converging supports; a 2.30-ATR move. FORECAST: unlikely in the next 4–6 weeks absent a negative catalyst; CONFIDENCE Moderate. The identifiable risk trigger is 27 August — a content-thin Extended Look would be the first credible route to the shelf. Thesis invalidation: the delay leg resolves discretely and cannot be time-projected; the competitive leg cannot resolve before the launch quarter reports in February 2027. FORECAST: no read available before 27 August; CONFIDENCE Low by construction. Profit-target ($290 with RSI > 70): needs +17.4% and roughly 16 RSI points, plausible only on a launch-driven move. FORECAST: not before 19 November; CONFIDENCE Moderate. Note the tension worth naming: this trigger would have a holder trimming at $290 while our own fair value is $191 — the profit-target rule is a momentum-exit convenience, not a valuation statement, and on this name the valuation work says the trimming should not wait for it.
What you are risking. Press the button at $246.95 today and the mechanical stop sits at $228 — −$18.95, or −7.7%. The bear path is $168, or −32.0%, and its dominant trigger is a third delay of a game already delayed twice. You are buying with the Fundamental entry group closed (fair value $191, some 29% below the price) and the Technical group unmet (Friday's advance came on 0.53× average volume, 0.6% under resistance at $248.46). And you are paying 36.4× the current fiscal year against a warranted 19.15×.
What you are gaining. The bull case at $332, +34.4%, anchored on a real transaction — Electronic Arts taken private on 4 August at 6.85× net bookings. You own the embedded optionality for nothing: an undated PC edition, the largest un-monetised in-game advertising surface in entertainment, and whatever GTA Online VI does to the monetisation gap. There is no dividend and a 0.7% trailing free-cash-flow yield, so you are paid nothing to wait.
The read. The base case is negative: on the central path the game ships exactly as promised and you are down 2.8% fifteen months later, because the launch is already in the multiple. You would be accepting a −32% tail and a −7.7% stop for an expected return of roughly zero. This is not a judgement that GTA VI will disappoint — the driver pillar is 80, our highest score. It is a judgement about what you are being asked to pay for it. An assessment of the trade-off, not advice.
What you are giving up. Selling at $246.95 forfeits the bull path to $332 (+34.4%) twelve days before the most likely positive catalyst of the quarter, and it forfeits the optionality — PC edition, advertising, the online-economy catch-up — you currently own for free. You would also be selling below the Street's $287.11 mean and below all twelve targets published in the last quarter (averaging $289.92). If GTA VI is the decade-defining annuity the bulls describe, this is the wrong moment to be out.
What you are protecting. A −32% bear case, on a stock whose next move is close to bimodal. And, on the framework's own numbers, a base case of −2.8%: you are not giving up a central-case gain, because there isn't one. You would also be selling into strength alongside the CEO's own related trusts, which sold 40,000 shares at $250.49–255.12 on 10 August with no Rule 10b5-1 plan on the filing.
The read. No mechanical exit rule is live — the stop at $228 is 7.7% away, no thesis-invalidation condition holds, and the profit-target test fails on both price and RSI, so exit_action is Hold. But the signal is SELL, and the two are answering different questions: the exit rules ask "has something broken?" (nothing has), while the signal asks "would the framework own this at this price?" (it would not). For a holder, that argues for reducing into strength rather than waiting for a stop that may never trigger.
No portfolio allocation or role was specified for this analysis, so the framework's rule applies: position sizing is not computed, and no default is invented. What can be said usefully is the shape of the risk.
| Volatility context | Value | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| ATR-14 (daily) | $8.24 = 3.34% of price | A one-standard-day move is about 3.3%. A 5% position behaves like a 0.17% daily portfolio swing |
| Beta vs S&P 500 | 0.98 | Market-like sensitivity — unusual for a single-catalyst name, and it understates the event risk. Beta is backward-looking and there has been no GTA launch inside the look-back |
| Drawdown, last 12 months | $265.94 → $187.63 = −29.4% | The March 2026 low. This stock has delivered a near-30% peak-to-trough inside the year |
| Risk per share to the stop | $246.95 → $228 = $18.95 | A position risking 1% of a portfolio implies roughly a 13% position at this stop distance — far too large for a binary-event name, and exactly why stop distance alone must not set size |
| Catalyst modifier | Clustering score 55 | Above the 50 line, so no mandated reduction. But two dated events inside 21 days argue for respecting the stop rather than widening it |
The §12 Conviction Ladder reads Half-Size (1 of 3 paths open) — only the Catalyst group is met, the Fundamental group having closed when the corrected anchor put fair value at $191. Read it for what it is: the ladder describes how much you would buy if you were buying, and the signal on all three horizons is SELL. The ladder is therefore informational here, not a size instruction. For an existing holder the mechanical exit action is Hold — no stop, thesis-invalidation or profit-target rule is live — but the signal and the exit rules answer different questions, and §12 sets out why reducing into strength is the more consistent reading.
{
"ticker": "TTWO",
"date": "2026-08-15",
"version": "v6",
"brand": "",
"company": "Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc.",
"currency": "USD",
"exchange": "NASDAQ",
"exchange_ticker": "NASDAQ:TTWO",
"isin": "US8740541094",
"api_ticker": "TTWO",
"gics_sector": "Communication Services",
"sector": "Communication Services",
"analysis_status": "on-going",
"finder_ticker": "TTWO",
"finder_exchange": "NASDAQ",
"user_context": {
"horizon": null,
"allocation_pct": null,
"portfolio_role": null
},
"price_at_rating": 246.95,
"price_as_of": "2026-08-14 close (15 Aug is a Saturday; US markets closed)",
"signal_short": "SELL",
"signal_medium": "SELL",
"signal_long": "SELL",
"primary_signal": "SELL",
"short_hold_reason": null,
"short_hold_reason_note": "Not applicable - the SKILL scopes short_hold_reason to a short HOLD or half-size starter. signal_short is SELL, produced directly by the base matrix (Medium quality x Expensive valuation), not by any cap.",
"short_cap_reason": "Not a cap and not a hold. The base decision matrix returns SELL on all three horizons from Medium quality (57) x EXPENSIVE valuation (35). short_entry_confirmed is TRUE (Catalyst group met: +6.04% post-earnings close on 2.12x the pre-event 20-day average volume with FY27 guidance reiterated), so the short technical-confirmation cap is not engaged - it only ever applies to a short BUY. The half-size quality-starter override does not fire either: it requires a base HOLD, Quality >= 65 (actual 57), a non-Expensive valuation (actual Expensive) and both medium and long BUY-or-better (both SELL). Gate 3 and Gate 5 are triggered and cap at HOLD MAXIMUM, which cannot raise a SELL.",
"short_entry_confirmed": true,
"quality_score": 57,
"lifecycle_stage": "growth",
"quality_detail": {
"industry_benchmark_name": "Net-Bookings Growth + Non-GAAP EBITDA Margin (publisher Rule of 40)",
"industry_benchmark_value": "FY27 guided +20.5% growth + 12.6% EBITDA margin = 33.1 (below the 40 line)",
"industry_benchmark_score": 60,
"moat_score": 65,
"roic_percentile_vs_peers": null,
"capital_allocation": 45,
"management_skin_in_game": 42,
"moat_subscores": {
"pricing_power": 78,
"network_effects": 62,
"switching_costs": 48,
"cost_advantage": 45,
"intangible_assets": 90
}
},
"valuation_score": 35,
"valuation_detail": {
"fcf_yield": 0.7,
"fcf_yield_forward": 1.5,
"implied_growth_rate": 26.7,
"implied_growth_note": "Solved from the two-stage formula at r=10.20%, g_term=3%: the growth needed for 5 years to warrant the actual 36.42x. Cross-check: warranted(26.65%)=36.42x, warranted(22%)=30.64x.",
"consensus_growth_rate": 15.4,
"consensus_growth_basis": "FY2027-FY2031 consensus EPS CAGR ($6.78 -> $12.02 = 15.39%) - the rate the anchor haircuts and the PEG denominator uses",
"consensus_growth_post_fy28": 6.4,
"consensus_growth_post_fy28_basis": "FY2028-FY2031 consensus EPS CAGR ($9.99 -> $12.02) - the post-launch plateau rate",
"historical_valuation_decile": 8,
"ev_sales": 7.07,
"ev_forward_bookings": 5.84,
"ev_usd_bn": 47.29
},
"warranted_multiple": 19.15,
"actual_multiple": 36.42,
"val_multiple_basis": "Forward P/E on FY2027 consensus EPS of $6.78 (n=15) - the CURRENT fiscal year, ending 31 March 2027. Both actual_multiple and clean_pe are struck on this same year, correcting an earlier draft that mixed FY2027 and FY2028. Actual 36.42x vs warranted 19.15x = 1.90 ratio -> EXPENSIVE; and 36.42x is independently at/above the 26x Communication Services guardrail (step 5b, no growth exception), so the band fires on two legs. Secondary read disclosed in section 4: FY2028 consensus EPS $9.99 gives 24.72x = 1.29 ratio (Full band, below the guardrail) - FY2028 is the only year of the five under estimate that sits under the line, so setting the band on it would be selecting the more comfortable answer. Warranted inputs: r = 10.20% (4.70% 10-Y from the 2026-08-12 macro report + 4.50% ERP + 1.00% add-on for Quality in the 40-64 band), g_near 10.0% (consensus FY27-FY31 EPS CAGR 15.39%, haircut 25% to 11.54%, capped at the 10% cyclical/legacy Communication Services line), g_term 3.0%. Robust: at a 4.63% risk-free the ratio is 1.88, and at a 15% secular growth cap it is 1.56 - Expensive on every defensible parameter set.",
"discount_rate_r": 10.2,
"risk_free_10y": 4.7,
"g_near": 10.0,
"g_term": 3.0,
"warranted_ratio": 1.9,
"val_band": "expensive",
"eps_trailing": -1.72,
"trailing_pe": -143.6,
"relative_strength_vs_spy": -3.2,
"relative_strength_vs_sector": 4.6,
"timing_score": 64,
"timing_detail": {
"mtf_confluence": 78,
"risk_reward_score": 40,
"relative_strength_vs_spy": -3.2,
"relative_strength_vs_sector": 4.6,
"catalyst_clustering_score": 55,
"dynamic_macro_weight": 0.1,
"rsi_14": 54.2,
"atr_14": 8.24,
"sma50": 237.86,
"sma200": 229.04,
"vol_ratio_latest": 0.53,
"vol_ratio_earnings_day": 2.12
},
"driver_score": 80,
"driver_label": "Strong Tailwind",
"driver_amplifies": "Does NOT fire, and cannot. Amplification only intensifies the direction the fundamentals already point. The base signal is SELL, and a SELL amplifies to STRONG SELL only on a driver <= 35 alongside Headwind economic pressure. The driver is 80 (Strong Tailwind) pointing the OPPOSITE way to the base signal, and economic pressure is Neutral - so both conditions fail. A driver disagreeing with the base signal is recorded as a caveat and is never permitted to soften the signal.",
"driver_commodity_trend": "n/a - not a commodity-leveraged name",
"nonop_pct_of_net_income": -22.4,
"nonop_note": "NEGATIVE = a drag, not an inflation. TTM totalOtherIncomeExpensesNet -$71.8m against a -$320.4m net loss. No inflated earnings figure to strip; the distortions are deferral accounting (-$132.4m in Q1), acquired-intangible amortisation ($168.4m) and a one-off $43.4m cancelled-title impairment.",
"clean_pe": 36.42,
"clean_peg": 2.4,
"competitive_share_trajectory": "stable",
"competitive_threat_level": "moderate",
"economic_alignment_stance": "Neutral",
"economic_alignment_conviction": 45,
"economic_alignment_pressure": "Neutral",
"economic_alignment_source": "sector-map",
"macro_report_date": "2026-08-12",
"overall_confidence": 62,
"fair_value_est": 191,
"fair_value_basis": "Warranted 19.15x applied to FY2028 consensus EPS $9.99. Disclosed asymmetry: the BAND is set on FY2027 (36.42x), and on that same year the warranted fair value would be 19.15 x 6.78 = $130. The $191 figure is the more generous of the two and is used for the entry rule because that rule is forward-looking over the next 12 months, by which point FY2028 is the operative earnings year. The Fundamental entry group closes on either figure.",
"stop_loss": 228,
"target_price": 240,
"scenario_base_target": 240,
"scenario_bull_target": 332,
"scenario_bear_target": 168,
"scenario_probabilities": {
"bull": 25,
"base": 55,
"bear": 20
},
"scenario_weighted_target": 249,
"entry_groups_met": 1,
"entry_conviction": "Half-Size",
"exit_groups_live": 0,
"exit_action": "Hold",
"hard_gate_state": "caution",
"gates_triggered": [
"Valuation Ceiling (Gate 3) - Expensive band on BOTH legs: actual 36.42x (FY2027 consensus EPS $6.78) / warranted 19.15x = 1.90 ratio, AND 36.42x is at/above the 26x Communication Services guardrail (step 5b, no growth exception). Caps at HOLD maximum; the base matrix already reads SELL, and a ceiling cannot raise a signal.",
"Binary Event (Gate 5) - Grand Theft Auto VI launch 19 Nov 2026: a two-sided outcome worth >20% (scenarios span -32.0% to +34.4%). Caps at HOLD maximum. Date reaffirmed this run from SEC 8-K exhibit 99.1, accession 0001628280-26-054580, filed 2026-08-07."
],
"gates_caution": [
"Financial Distress - GAAP interest-coverage artefact (-0.8x on GAAP EBIT vs 10.6x on EBITDA using gross interest expense of $93.2m); not a cash shortfall"
],
"dnb_trigger2_adjudication": "Does NOT fire. Arm (a) needs actual >= 2.0x warranted (38.30x) or >= 1.5x guardrail (39.00x); actual is 36.42x, below both by ~5%. Arm (b) needs Expensive PLUS a Structural Business Model Threat or an armed systemic tail that materially applies; there is no structural threat and TTWO is not in the AI-concentration cohort.",
"do_not_buy_triggers": [],
"analyst_consensus_target": 287.11,
"analyst_target_high": 368,
"analyst_target_low": 170,
"analyst_target_median": 290.0,
"analyst_target_upside_pct": 16.3,
"analyst_target_source": "Yahoo panel n=29 (FMP recent-window panel: consensus 291.30, median 292.50, range 270-313)",
"analyst_grades_consensus": "Buy",
"analyst_bullish_pct": 79,
"analyst_coverage_count": 29,
"analyst_coverage_note": "29 firms with published price targets (Yahoo panel); 57 firms issuing ratings in the grades distribution (45 Buy / 12 Hold) - different populations",
"fmp_rating": "D+",
"fmp_overall_score": 1,
"recent_upgrades_30d": 0,
"recent_downgrades_30d": 0,
"recent_maintains_30d": 7,
"grades_note": "Seven maintains dated 2026-08-10 (Oppenheimer, BTIG, Wells Fargo, Roth, DA Davidson, Wedbush, Baird) - no upgrades, no downgrades. An earlier draft wrongly recorded a data gap here.",
"gta6_release_window": "2026-11-19 - REAFFIRMED this run from a PRIMARY source: SEC Form 8-K exhibit 99.1, accession 0001628280-26-054580, filed 2026-08-07 (CEO quote 'the November 19th launch of Grand Theft Auto VI' + the future-lineup table). Standard edition $80. Next dated catalyst: 'GTA VI: An Extended Look' on 2026-08-27.",
"q1_fy27": {
"net_bookings_usd_m": 1390,
"net_bookings_yoy_pct": -3.0,
"gaap_revenue_usd_m": 1533.9,
"gaap_eps": -0.18,
"non_gaap_ebitda_usd_m": 167.0,
"impairment_usd_m": 43.4,
"rcs_pct_of_bookings": 84
},
"fy27_guidance": {
"net_bookings_usd_m": "8000-8200",
"gaap_revenue_usd_m": "7900-8100",
"gaap_diluted_eps": "0.55-0.75",
"non_gaap_ebitda_usd_m": "993-1053",
"ocf_usd_m": ">1000",
"capex_usd_m": 290
},
"next_update_date": "2026-08-28",
"next_update_basis": "'GTA VI: An Extended Look' 2026-08-27 + 1 trading day (the binding arm; the +14d default would fall 2026-08-29, a Saturday, rolling to 2026-08-31)",
"delta_vs_prior": "Versus calibration-TTWO-20260731-1200.json, whose gates_triggered array was empty: Gates 3 and 5 are NEWLY TRIGGERED, so this report carries two triggered gates where 31 July carried none. Gate 3 Valuation Ceiling, clear -> TRIGGERED: the Expensive band fires on both of its independent legs - actual 36.42x against a warranted 19.15x = 1.90 ratio, and 36.42x is at/above the 26x Communication Services guardrail - where the 31 July report priced the name off a synthetic 25.5x blend that landed half a point beneath that guardrail (val_band fair -> expensive). Gate 5 Binary Event, caution -> TRIGGERED: 31 July carried 'Binary Event - GTA VI 19 Nov' in gates_caution, and it is promoted this run because the 19 November 2026 Grand Theft Auto VI launch is a genuinely two-sided outcome worth more than 20% either way (the section 11 scenarios span -32.0% to +34.4%); conceding that span while filing the event as a caution would contradict this report's own scenario table. Both gates cap at HOLD maximum, and a cap is a ceiling rather than a floor: the SELL is produced independently by the base decision matrix (Medium quality 57 x Expensive valuation 35), so the two gates confirm rather than cause it. The rest of gates_caution turns over: 31 July's 'Earnings Event Risk (7 Aug)' has cleared now that Q1 FY2027 is reported, leaving the Financial Distress GAAP interest-coverage artefact (-0.8x on GAAP EBIT vs 10.6x on EBITDA) as the single remaining caution."
}
This snapshot is the machine-readable record behind every number above. The fields most likely to matter downstream: val_band is "expensive" — the warranted-multiple anchor computes to 19.15× against an actual 36.42×, a ratio of 1.90, and the actual also breaches the 26× Communication Services guardrail, so both legs of the Expensive test fire; gates_triggered carries two gates (Valuation Ceiling and Binary Event), each capping at HOLD maximum, which cannot lift the base matrix's SELL; do_not_buy_triggers is empty after both arms of Trigger 2 were adjudicated and failed by roughly 5%; nonop_pct_of_net_income is negative, meaning non-operating items are a drag rather than an inflation, the inverse of the usual step-7b case; and hard_gate_state is "caution", which is the schema's derivation for a name with triggered gates but no Do-Not-Buy trigger.
limit=15 returns the 10 August batch; the gap did not exist, the penalty has been removed and the grade-actions row raised from 50 to 60 (which lifted the overall sentiment sub-score from 62 to 64). recent_upgrades_30d = 0 and recent_downgrades_30d = 0 are correct as a description of actions, with seven maintains behind themget_yahoo_prices, which is correctly dated and reconciles bar-for-bar on values. Not used for any dated statement in this reportttwo1q27earningsrelease.htm, accession 0001628280-26-054580, filed 7 Aug 2026. Contains the CEO quote "excitement around the November 19th launch of Grand Theft Auto VI" and reiterating FY2027 net bookings of $8.0–8.2bn, plus a future-lineup table listing "Grand Theft Auto VI — PS5, Xbox Series X|S — November 19, 2026" and "NBA 2K27 — September 4, 2026". All Q1 and guidance figures in this report are taken from this document, not from an aggregatordividendPerShareTTM = 0, dividendYieldTTM = 0, payout ratio 0. Take-Two pays no dividend, so no dividend-date or raise-versus-re-declaration check appliesPricing is as of the Friday 14 August 2026 close ($246.95). This report is dated Saturday 15 August; US markets are closed, so the 14 August print is the latest available and no intraday staleness applies.
Confidence haircuts actually applied. Quality 62% (base 80, less 10 because GAAP metrics are uninformative and the analysis is forced onto a management basis, less 8 because peer margin medians are web-estimated). Valuation 73% (base 80, +5 price-target consensus, +5 grades consensus, +3 ratings snapshot, less 10 for an estimated sector median on EV/bookings, less 10 because the target spread is 2.16× high-to-low). An earlier draft applied a further −15 for "no forward earnings estimates exist" — on a name with fifteen of them. That penalty was self-contradictory and has been removed; it was the same error that produced the withdrawn anchor. Timing 70% (base 75, less 5 for the Polygon date-shift reconstruction; the −10 analyst-grades penalty is removed, see above). Drivers 62% (base 70, less 8 because management declined to quantify unit sales, recurrent contribution or edition mix). Overall confidence is the weakest link: 62%.
0. Corrections carried in this version. This report was rejected by an independent audit in an earlier form and rebuilt. The material corrections, all disclosed in place rather than silently patched: (i) the valuation anchor had been withdrawn (val_band: "na") on grounds the framework does not permit — it is now computed, lands Expensive, fires Gate 3, and moves all three horizons from HOLD to SELL; (ii) a claimed get_stock_grades data gap did not exist — seven maintains dated 10 August were there all along; the confidence penalty taken for it is removed and the grade-actions row went 50→60, lifting the sentiment sub-score 62→64; (iii) the published explanation for the Quality cut did not match its own arithmetic and has been rewritten to the numbers that actually moved it; (iv) the risk-free rate was mis-cited; (v) several arithmetic and labelling errors listed below. The audit also independently re-pulled the 8-K and confirmed every primary-source figure, and ruled in favour of the pre-event volume denominator used in the Catalyst test.
1. Data provenance. Every mandatory pull is listed above with its result; two are recorded as failures (get_stock_prices dating, get_risk_factors) and the fallback used is named in each case. Nothing unrun is presented as covered.
2. Live-status re-verification (the critical one). The Grand Theft Auto VI release date is the single most price-relevant fact in this report and it was verified this run from the primary filing: SEC Form 8-K exhibit 99.1, accession 0001628280-26-054580, filed 7 August 2026, retrieved directly from EDGAR — it both quotes the CEO on "the November 19th launch" and tabulates "Grand Theft Auto VI — November 19, 2026" in the forward lineup. A separate current search for delay reporting returned no credible slip. Corporate-status checks: Take-Two is actively trading; Electronic Arts is no longer a listed comparable — its $55bn take-private completed 4 August 2026 and it is delisted, so it appears here as a transaction comparable and a private competitor, not a quoted peer. The 27 August "Extended Look" date was verified against Rockstar's own announcement.
2b. Share count and enterprise value reconciled. Diluted shares of 186.2m × $246.95 = $46.0bn against a reported market capitalisation of $46.17bn — a 0.4% difference, explained by the guided FY2027 share count of 189.4m, so the provider figure is not stale. Enterprise value of $47.29bn sits correctly above market capitalisation (net debt $1.12bn), so the broken-EV trap does not apply. Interest expense of $93.2m is the sum of four quarterly interestExpense lines, itemised in §3 so it can be checked.
3. Internal consistency. Four places where the data contradicts a comfortable narrative, resolved in the data's favour: (i) the guide says FY2027 bookings +20.5% but Q1 bookings fell 3% and non-GAAP EBITDA fell 26% year-on-year — the Quality sub-signals are scored off the reported quarter, not the guide; (ii) the multi-timeframe tool returns "strongly bullish" but Friday's advance came on 0.53× average volume into a lower high — the MTF score is marked down to 78 and the Technical entry group left unmet; (iii) the driver is a Strong Tailwind at 80 while the signal is SELL, and the report says so in terms rather than letting the story carry the rating; (iv) the base-case scenario target of $240 sits below the current price, so no reward-to-risk credit is taken in the Timing pillar — an earlier draft added 8 unexplained points there. The 20-day volume average used for the Catalyst test (1,883,835, the 20 sessions ending 6 August) is the pre-event baseline, which is the correct and non-circular denominator; the post-event average of 2,100,212 is used for the Technical test. On the current average the earnings-day ratio would be 1.90× rather than 2.12× and the Catalyst group would fail — the choice is disclosed because it is load-bearing for the ladder, though not for the signal.
4. Completeness. All fifteen sections present and carrying specific figures. The thinnest is §13, by design: no allocation or portfolio role was supplied, so the framework forbids inventing one.
5. Carried-forward diff. Nothing was copied. Quality rebuilt from sub-scores (70→57) with the arithmetic shown and the true drivers named; Valuation rebuilt with the anchor computed (57→35, band fair→expensive); own-history decile corrected (3→8); Timing rebuilt (54→64); driver re-scored (78→80); every entry and exit group re-tested against this week's prices and volumes; all three scenarios re-derived from the corrected anchor rather than adjusted.
6. Signal caps. short_entry_confirmed = true (the Catalyst group is met on all three sub-conditions), so no technical-confirmation cap applies — and it is moot, because the base matrix returns SELL. The half-size quality-starter override was tested and correctly does not fire (it needs Quality ≥ 65 and a base HOLD; Quality is 57 and the base is SELL). Amplification was tested and correctly does not fire: a SELL amplifies to STRONG SELL only on a driver ≤ 35 with Headwind pressure, and the driver is 80 with Neutral pressure. Gate 3 and Gate 5 are both triggered and both cap at HOLD maximum, which cannot raise a SELL. Do-Not-Buy Trigger 2 was adjudicated on both arms and does not fire, with the margins stated (36.42× against thresholds of 38.30× and 39.00×).
7. Earnings quality (step 7b), the inverted case. Non-operating items reduce income rather than inflate it: TTM totalOtherIncomeExpensesNet is −$71.8m against a −$320.4m net loss, so nonop_pct_of_net_income is −22.4 — negative, a drag, with no inflated figure to strip. The real distortions are all in the company's own reconciliation: a −$132.4m deferral swing, $86.0m of stock-based compensation, $168.4m of acquired-intangible amortisation, and a discretionary $43.4m impairment on a cancelled third-party title inside cost of revenue. Strip that impairment and the quarter's −$35.5m operating loss becomes roughly +$8m; non-GAAP EBITDA is $167.0m. clean_pe and actual_multiple are now recorded on the same basis — FY2027 consensus, 36.42× — correcting an earlier draft that took one from FY2027 and the other from FY2028. eps_trailing (−$1.72) and trailing_pe (−143.6×) come from a single source so they reconcile against the price.
Design conformance. Rendered by build_stock_report.py from a spec — full-width shell, fifteen numbered sections with subtitles, the §12 Rule Forecast, the §3 Competitive Environment block and the company-profile box all present and asserted by the builder. Deterministic pre-audit (lint_report.py, including its framework-compliance block, which the withdrawn anchor had previously silenced) and the calibration schema gate both run clean.