Signals BUY on all three horizons, from HOLD / BUY / BUY. The Short is upgraded because the volume-backed breakout my own prior report specified in advance arrived on 31 August. The Medium and Long hold their BUY. No STRONG BUY: the valuation sits in the Full band, which blocks amplification.
Three of those four corrections are favourable to the stock. The Short is upgraded to BUY on a breakout my own prior report asked for in advance. But the valuation basis has also been rebuilt the way the framework requires, which takes Valuation down 18 points and rules out any STRONG BUY. That is not a reaction to the news, it is the result of valuing the name the way the framework actually requires, which I had not previously done.
Canadian Copper Inc. is a New Brunswick base-metals developer built around the 100%-owned Murray Brook deposit in the Bathurst Mining Camp, a mature volcanogenic-massive-sulphide district. Its edge is brownfield: rather than build a mill, it plans to open-pit Murray Brook and truck ore roughly 13 km to the adjacent, already-permitted Caribou process plant, which it now owns outright. Despite the name, the PEA's revenue is predominantly zinc, with copper, silver and lead behind it.
Lifecycle: a funded PEA-stage base-metals developer. Traditional metrics — P/E, EBITDA, ROE — are meaningless here; there is no production. Quality is scored on the pre-production ladder: study strength, distance to production, permitting, funding and infrastructure control.
What genuinely improved this quarter. The funding stack is the headline. OR Royalties committed C$38.35M for a 20% life-of-mine payable silver and gold stream, and Ocean Partners up to C$48M of project debt against 100% of offtake[4]. C$12.5M of that landed on 16 July, alongside an equity subscription of 7,306,666 shares at C$0.75[5] — a top-five streamer paying above where the shares trade today. On 11 August Ocean exercised 12,725,000 warrants for C$3.18M and the Company used the proceeds to eliminate its US$2M of debt, taking its stake to 21.34%[3]. A feasibility study is under way with DRA Americas, due December 2026.
What has not changed. It is pre-revenue, single-complex and CSE-listed. 55% of the C$96M is optional at the Company's discretion, and OR's construction instalments are conditional on five separate milestones: all remaining permits, Board approval of construction, material agreements for execution, full funding to completion available at each instalment, and a financial model supporting a minimum debt-service coverage ratio[4]. Committed is not the same as drawn. The debt tranche is a 36-month facility at SOFR+7.75% with a 12-month grace period — a short tenor to build a mine against.
Balance sheet. At 31 January 2026 the Company held C$15.4M cash and C$12.69M working capital with no revenue[6]. Rolling that forward for the March flow-through, the July and August receipts, the Caribou payment, the debt repayment and burn of roughly C$1.1M a quarter [15] puts net cash near C$18M, on a plausible range of C$15-22M. I want to be plain that this is my estimate, not a reported figure — I did not retrieve the April interim statements, and the data provider's cash and debt fields are null (see §15, where that source is recorded as failed and is not used anywhere in this report).
Who it actually competes with. Not the copper majors — at this stage the competition is for capital and for construction slots among North American VMS and zinc developers. The closest comparators are Foran Mining (McIlvenna Bay, Saskatchewan — a copper-zinc VMS project further down the build path than Murray Brook), Osisko Metals (Pine Point, a Canadian zinc redevelopment), and Callinex Mines (Pine Bay, Manitoba). Within the Bathurst camp itself the competitive field is thin, which is the point.
Share trajectory: gaining, and structurally so. Caribou was Trevali Mining’s plant before Trevali’s insolvency put it on the market; Canadian Copper acquired it and completed the title transfer in July 2026. That leaves it holding a fully permitted, past-producing 3,000 tpd process plant in a mature district[1], which converts a would-be greenfield build into a truck-and-toll operation about 13 km away[1]. Any other deposit in the camp has to come to that mill or build its own.
What that is worth, and what it is not. Owning the district’s bottleneck is a real and durable advantage, and it is the single largest contributor to the moat score of 58. But a moat around a mine that has not been built is a moat around an option. It lowers capital intensity and shortens the path to production; it does not protect margin, because a developer with no output has no margin to protect, and it gives no pricing power whatsoever over zinc, copper or silver — this is a price-taker in every one of its four revenue lines. That is why the moat reads moderate rather than strong, and why the competitive position lifts Quality without touching Valuation.
Quality 74 — up from 71. Funded, debt-free and with a permitted plant it owns, against a project that still has to be feasibility-studied, permitted and built.
The anchor, and what it now says. For a pre-production miner the framework fixes two things I do not get to choose: the NAV is built from the published study at that study’s own base-case deck, and the resulting NPV is discounted 30–50% for construction risk. Both are applied below.
The build. Project NPV7% after tax of C$171M at the PEA deck[1], plus C$28.5M for the present value of the OR Royalties deposit instalments still receivable[5], less C$24.4M for the silver stream give-up, less C$12M of corporate overhead, plus C$18M net cash, plus C$5.92M of warrant proceeds = C$187.0M. Across 236,418,200 fully diluted shares that is C$0.791 per share, so at C$0.72 the stock trades on 0.910× NAV.
The offsetting correction, applied in the same pass. The same audit found that I had valued the give-up using an average multiple — one derived from a study NPV that is already net of capital and tax — where a marginal one is required. Rebuilt as an after-tax annuity over the 13.2-year mine life deferred 2.5 years to first production, the correct multiple is 5.20×, which raises the give-up to C$24.4M. That pushes against the first correction, and I have run both rather than only the flattering one.
What is excluded, and why. Ocean Partners’ C$48M debt facility is left out entirely[4]. Its proceeds are offset by repayment plus SOFR+7.75% interest, so crediting the draw without carrying the liability would flatter NAV. The C$64M of initial capital stays netted inside the PEA’s own NPV, because it is unspent — a project whose capital has already been spent requires the opposite treatment.
The verdict. Against a warranted 0.70× — the most generous end of the mandated 30–50% construction discount — 0.910× gives a ratio of 1.30×, the Full band. That is above fair but below the 1.40× Valuation Ceiling, so the gate does not fire and the signal is not capped. It does block any amplification to STRONG BUY, which is the right outcome: you do not back the truck up on a developer priced above what its stage warrants.
The framework blends four relative lenses inside the band the anchor sets (Sector Median 20%, Own-History Decile 15%, PEG 10%, Analyst Consensus 15%; the anchor carries 40%). Three do not resolve here, and I would rather show the empty boxes than score around them.
The score therefore rests largely on the anchor, which is a real weakness rather than a formality, and is why valuation confidence is 58% — the lowest of the three, so it sets the overall.
Valuation 45 — the Full band. Fair value on the anchor is C$0.55, below today’s price; the case for owning it rests on the warranted multiple rising as the project de-risks, not on NAV being cheap today.
A single NAV number would be dishonest here, so here is the surface. The left row is what the framework anchors on; the right is what today’s metal prices would be worth if they held for thirteen years, which is a statement about optionality and not a forecast.
| Basis | Cu | Zn | Ag | Project NPV7 | Give-up | NAV | NAV/sh (FD) | P/NAV |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PEA deck — the anchor | US$4.25 | US$1.30 | US$27 | C$171M | −C$24.4M | C$181M | C$0.791 | 0.91× |
| Spot held for life of mine | US$6.46 | US$1.81 | US$63.24 | C$533M | −C$57M | C$510M | C$2.18 | 0.33× |
The NAV column is before warrant proceeds; the NAV/share column adds the C$5.92M of warrant cash and divides by the 236,418,200 fully diluted count, which is why NAV ÷ shares does not reproduce it directly.
Read the give-up column. It grows with silver — −C$24.4M at the deck becomes −C$57M at spot. The bull case carries its own offset, which is why it is shown rather than netted away.
The framework caps what this row may do, and I am applying that cap. Spot-versus-base-case commodity upside is explicitly an optionality tilt of +3 to +8 points, never a re-rating — it must not turn a richly-priced core into a cheap one on hope. So the right-hand row informs the Drivers pillar and the bull scenario. It is not the anchor and it has not been used as one.
A caution on the right-hand column. It scales the NPV linearly with operating margin on a fixed mine plan — reasonable near the deck, unreliable far from it, because cut-off grades, tax and royalties all move. It does not carry the standing of the PEA’s own published NPV.
The weakest joint in this model, stated plainly. The cash OR Royalties pays is credited at its contracted nominal value; the stream it buys is charged at the PEA’s US$27/oz deck. Those are two different silver prices. OR agreed the C$38.35M in April 2026, when silver closed the month at US$73.53 — above today’s level, not below it. Netted out, the model books +C$11.1M of value created by an arm’s-length financing, equivalent to pricing the credit side off an implied silver deck near US$39/oz. That is worth 0.08 on the ratio — not a rounding error, and the largest single judgement in this valuation. Treat the financing as exactly value-neutral instead and the ratio is 1.38×, only C$2.2M of NAV from the 1.40× ceiling that would cap all three horizons at HOLD. This is the assumption to attack if you disagree with me.
What the market is paying. Solving the model for the price, C$0.72 implies deck revenue -2.6% against the PEA’s. The market is capitalising essentially none of the 39–134% gap between the 2025 deck and today’s metal prices — and on the corrected model it now prices the project at a modest discount to the deck case itself. That gap is the bull case; it converts only if the mine gets built.
The name is misleading, and it matters. At the PEA deck this is a zinc project: zinc is 48% of revenue, copper 27%, silver 17% and lead 9%[1]. My copper correction therefore applies to barely a quarter of the revenue line. Zinc and silver decide more.
All four legs sit above the deck. Copper US$6.46/lb, +52% on deck and +41% year-on-year[7]. Zinc US$1.84/lb, +42% on deck and the highest in over four years[8]. Silver US$63.24/oz against a US$27 deck[9]. On the tape copper sits 8.7% above a rising 200-day average.
Where I am sceptical. Silver at these levels is a monetary-stress print, not an industrial one — it fell 3% in a single session[9] — and thirteen years of US$63 silver is not a forecast anyone should make. Copper momentum has flattened: −2.0% over the month[7]. And the macro report puts copper Underweight on the short horizon, Neutral on the medium and only Strong Overweight on the long[10].
Driver 70 — a genuine tailwind, sat in the middle of the band rather than the top, because the short-horizon copper call and silver's instability both argue against the maximum. It meets the amplification threshold, but the Full band blocks any lift to STRONG BUY.
The 9 September macro report has the dominant regime as energy-shock stagflation at 48% and Materials Overweight across all three horizons[10]. Hard assets do comparatively well when the shock is in energy and the policy debate is hike-versus-hold, which is a tailwind for a base-metals developer.
The divergence, flagged rather than averaged away. The framework anchors pressure on the medium horizon; the copper asset class is short Underweight, medium Neutral, long Strong Overweight[10]. So the economic tailwind is weakest exactly where this report's tape signal is strongest, and that is worth holding in mind before treating the Short BUY as the easiest of the three.
Pressure Tailwind, stance Trend-Following, conviction 70. It made no difference to the outcome: both amplification arms are met, but the Full valuation band blocks any lift to STRONG BUY regardless.
Source: sector map (GICS Materials → XLB) · Macro report 2026-09-09
The tape did what I asked it to do. My 4 August report capped the short horizon and wrote the release condition down in advance: 'a volume-backed daily close above C$0.68'[14]. On 31 August the shares closed at C$0.720 on 1.54× average volume. There have been eight consecutive closes above C$0.68 since, and 10 September printed C$0.72 on 2.95× average volume — the heaviest session in the window[11].
Price sits 12.6% above a rising 50-day average and 19.0% above the 200-day, up 20.0% over eight weeks[11]. The condition was met on its own terms, so the short-horizon cap is released and the Short carries a BUY alongside the other two horizons.
Timing 70, up sharply from 56 — but not higher, and the reason matters. The monthly RSI is 71.1[16], which is overbought. This name has already run 16% since my last report. Confirmed strength and a good entry are not the same thing, and what the tape does not do is make the stock cheap: the valuation is still in the Full band, which is why this is a BUY and not a STRONG BUY.
One live mechanic. 23,685,200 warrants at C$0.25 expire 12 November 2026 — +11.1% fully diluted, C$5.92M of cash[3]. The acceleration clause needs a C$0.30 VWAP over ten consecutive sessions; the last ten closes have all been at or above C$0.65[11], so the condition looks comfortably met on a closing basis. The Company stated on 11 August that it had not triggered it[3], and I am not going to assert that it has.
| Date | Event | Impact | Forecast | Previous | Relevant? | Why |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-25 | Next scheduled Donatien review | Company-specific | — | — | ✅ Yes | +14d standing ceiling; no dated binary inside the window |
| 2026-11-12 | 23,685,200 warrants at C$0.25 expire | Company-specific | — | — | ✅ Yes | +11.1% fully diluted, C$5.92M cash if exercised |
| 2026-12-XX | DRA Americas Feasibility Study | High | — | — | ✅ Yes | The dated re-rate catalyst; may revise the C$64M PEA capex |
| Timeframe | Trend | Direction | RSI | MACD | Key S/R | Breakout | Vol |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Monthly | Uptrend | Bullish | ~62 | rising | S: 0.58 R: 0.82 | None | — |
| Weekly | Breakout confirmed | Bullish | ~64 | rising | S: 0.66 R: 0.82 | Cleared 0.68 | 2.0x |
| Daily | Above rising 50-DMA | Bullish | ~61 | rising | S: 0.68 R: 0.74 | 8 closes > 0.68 | 2.95x |
| Hourly | Consolidating at highs | Neutral | ~55 | flat | S: 0.70 R: 0.74 | None | — |
The December feasibility study confirms the PEA at something like current metal prices, the discretionary financing is drawn, and a construction decision follows. The stock re-rates toward the spot-deck NAV at a developer multiple. This is the case where today's metal prices actually convert into value.
The feasibility study lands broadly PEA-like on better metals, but construction risk becomes concrete rather than theoretical as the build approaches, and the shares settle near the unrisked NAV itself — above the C$0.55 the anchor pays for today, well below the spot case.
The feasibility study raises capex materially above C$64M, one or more milestone conditions delay the discretionary tranches, or the metals complex gives back its 2026 gains — most plausibly silver, which is the most extended of the four and the one the stream is written against.
Probability-weighted value C$0.87 against C$0.72 today, about 20% of upside. That sits alongside an anchor fair value of C$0.55, which is below the price, and the gap between the two is the whole argument rather than a contradiction. The anchor asks what a PEA-stage developer deserves today; the weighted figure asks what the range of outcomes is worth. A name can be above what its stage warrants and still be worth owning if the de-risking path is credible — that is precisely what a Full-band BUY means, and it is why the same framework refuses to call it a STRONG BUY.
Forecast: Fundamental: shut, and it is the binding one. It reopens if the price falls toward C$0.55, or if the warranted multiple itself rises — which is what a December feasibility study confirming capex at or below C$64M would do, by moving the name off the PEA-stage discount. That is the more likely route. Technical: already met and holding, though overbought on the monthly. Catalyst: opens when the feasibility study gets a firm date. Forecast confidence: Moderate that the Fundamental group reopens on the study rather than on a price fall. Low that anything reopens it inside the next fortnight — which is why the next review is 25 September on the standing ceiling, and the one that matters is December.
Where the re-rating has to come from. Not from NAV. At C$0.791 per share the stock is already at 0.91× NAV, so the case is that the warranted multiple rises as the project stops being a PEA. A December feasibility study that confirms the economics with capex at or below C$64M moves this name from 'PEA-stage' toward 'construction-ready', and the discount the framework applies narrows from 30% toward something nearer 10–20%. That is the trade.
What would take me to STRONG BUY. The ratio falling below 1.20× — about C$15.6M of NAV, or roughly a C$0.06 lower share price. A feasibility study confirming capex would do it from the NAV side.
What would take me back to HOLD or lower. A feasibility capex materially above C$64M; a failed or withdrawn milestone on the OR construction instalments; or the warrants expiring unexercised on 12 November, which would say the market had stopped paying above C$0.25. The ratio only has to reach 1.40× — C$13.3M of NAV — for the Valuation Ceiling to cap this at HOLD.
The honest summary. This is a genuinely better company than it was in August: funded, debt-free, owning the district’s fully permitted, past-producing mill, with every metal well above the deck its economics were struck at and a streamer who paid C$0.75 for stock now at C$0.72. It is also priced above what a pre-feasibility developer warrants, has already run 16% since my last report, and is overbought on the monthly. A BUY, at a size that reflects all of that — not a table-thumper.
You are risking 19% to the stop to gain 10% to NAV at the deck.
What you are risking. The stop is C$0.58, 19.4% below here. The bear case is C$0.45 — a December feasibility study that raises the C$64M capex, a milestone slipping on the discretionary financing, or the metals giving back their 2026 gains. You are also buying a valuation already in the Full band: you are paying above what this stage warrants and relying on the study to close the gap.
What you are gaining. NAV is C$0.79 a share at the PEA’s own deck and C$2.18 at spot. You own the gap between a 2025 deck and metals trading well above it — optionality the market is capitalising at close to nothing — plus a funded balance sheet, no debt, and the district’s permitted mill.
The read: half size is defensible. The December study is the event that decides this, and it is worth more than any entry you can pick before it.
You would be giving up the study optionality to avoid a build you do not have to fund.
What you are giving up. Base C$0.79, bull C$1.50, and the whole spot-over-deck gap — which converts only if the mine gets built. You would be selling a funded, debt-free developer that owns the permitted mill.
What you are protecting. Nothing mechanical: no exit trigger is live, the stop is well below, and the price is under the base target. You would be protecting against execution — a PEA is not a feasibility study, and 55% of the financing is discretionary.
The read: no mechanical reason to sell. A hold, with December as the decision point.
{
"ticker": "CCI.CN",
"date": "2026-09-11",
"version": "v6",
"brand": "",
"company": "Canadian Copper Inc.",
"currency": "CAD",
"exchange": "CSE",
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"lifecycle_stage": "pea-stage-developer-funded",
"sector": "Materials",
"gics_sector": "Materials",
"price_at_rating": 0.72,
"signal_short": "BUY",
"signal_medium": "BUY",
"signal_long": "BUY",
"primary_signal": "BUY",
"short_signal": "BUY",
"short_hold_reason": null,
"short_entry_confirmed": true,
"short_cap_reason": "Not capped. The prior report's own written release condition \u2014 'a volume-backed daily close > C$0.68' \u2014 was met on 31 Aug (C$0.720 on 1.54x average volume), with eight consecutive closes above C$0.68 since and 10 Sep at 2.95x average. Gate 3 does not fire at a 1.30x warranted ratio.",
"quality_score": 74,
"valuation_score": 45,
"timing_score": 70,
"driver_score": 70,
"driver_commodity_trend": "Copper US$6.46/lb (11 Sep, Trading Economics; COMEX HG=F 6.5395) \u2014 +52% vs the PEA's US$4.25 deck, +41% y/y, 8.7% above a rising 200-DMA but -2.0% over the month. Zinc US$1.808/lb (US$3,985.75/t, 8 Sep) \u2014 +39% vs the US$1.30 deck and the highest in over four years. Silver US$63.24/oz (11 Sep) vs a US$27 deck. NOTE the revenue weighting: at deck this is Zn 48% / Cu 27% / Ag 17% / Pb 9% \u2014 a zinc project, not a copper one. Macro 2026-09-09: Copper/Ind Metals short U / med N / long SO; Materials (XLB) O / O / O. CORRECTED FIELD: the prior version of this field carried 'spot ~US$4.02/lb', which was CPER's ETF share price divided by ten, and a 3 Aug stamp. Rebuilt from this run's data.",
"economic_alignment_stance": "Trend-Following",
"economic_alignment_conviction": 70,
"economic_alignment_pressure": "Tailwind",
"economic_alignment_source": "sector-map",
"macro_report_date": "2026-09-09",
"overall_confidence": 58,
"val_band": "full",
"warranted_multiple": 0.7,
"actual_multiple": 0.91,
"val_multiple_basis": "forward P/NAV \u2014 NAV built bottom-up from the Ausenco PEA (22 May 2025) at its OWN base-case deck (Cu US$4.25/lb, Zn US$1.30/lb, Ag US$27/oz, Pb US$1.10/lb) per SKILL L506; warranted 0.70x = the most generous end of the 30-50% pre-production construction discount (L587)",
"warranted_ratio": 1.3,
"fair_value_est": 0.55,
"stop_loss": 0.58,
"target_price": 0.79,
"scenario_base_target": 0.79,
"scenario_bull_target": 1.5,
"scenario_bear_target": 0.45,
"entry_groups_met": 1,
"entry_conviction": "Half-Size",
"exit_groups_live": 0,
"exit_action": "Hold",
"hard_gate_state": "caution",
"gates_triggered": [],
"gates_caution": [
"Valuation Ceiling (Gate 3) \u2014 does NOT fire at a 1.30x warranted ratio (Full band), but the margin is thin and one-sided. On the model as built it sits C$13.3M of NAV below the 1.40x Expensive threshold that caps every horizon at HOLD; treat the OR Royalties financing as exactly value-neutral instead of crediting its consideration and the ratio is 1.38x \u2014 only C$2.2M below it. It also blocks amplification to STRONG BUY.",
"Dilution/Financing (23,685,200 warrants at C$0.25 expiring 12 Nov 2026 = +11.1% fully diluted; plus up to C$5M optional Ocean equity)",
"Debt service (Ocean Partners C$48M at SOFR+7.75%, 36-month term with a 12-month grace period \u2014 a short tenor against a mine build)",
"Regulatory/Binary (Murray Brook EIA registered 13 Jul 2026, in review; Feasibility Study with DRA Americas due Dec 2026 may revise the C$64M PEA capex)",
"Single-asset, pre-revenue (no operating cash flow; 55% of the C$96M package is optional at the Company's discretion and OR's construction instalments are milestone-conditional)"
],
"do_not_buy_triggers": [],
"competitive_share_trajectory": "gaining",
"competitive_threat_level": "moderate",
"moat_score": 58,
"industry_benchmark_name": "Mining (pre-production): PEA NPV/IRR + distance-to-production",
"industry_benchmark_value": "NPV7 C$171M / 36% IRR / C$64M capex / 13.2yr LOM (Ausenco PEA, 22 May 2025)",
"industry_benchmark_score": 72,
"fcf_yield": null,
"analyst_consensus_target": 1.0,
"analyst_coverage_count": 1,
"fmp_rating": null,
"nonop_pct_of_net_income": null,
"clean_pe": null,
"clean_peg": null,
"economic_study": "Ausenco PEA ('Combined Strategy'), 22 May 2025 \u2014 after-tax NPV7% C$171M, IRR 36%, payback 2yr, initial capex C$64M, 13.2yr mine life, deck Cu US$4.25/lb / Zn US$1.30/lb / Ag US$27/oz / Pb US$1.10/lb. CONFIRMED via the company release, newsfilecorp and juniorminingnetwork. (An earlier basis string in this calibration carried C$169M; the company's own release title states C$171M, which is used throughout.)",
"next_update_date": "2026-09-25",
"next_update_basis": "+14d, the scheduling ceiling. No dated binary falls inside the window \u2014 the DRA Americas feasibility study is 'December 2026' with no fixed date and the warrants expire 12 Nov 2026 \u2014 so the default ceiling governs rather than a catalyst date.",
"prior_report": "calibration-CCI.CN-20260804-1338.json",
"prior_primary": "BUY",
"composite_short": 65,
"composite_medium": 63,
"composite_long": 65,
"base_signal_short": "BUY",
"base_signal_medium": "BUY",
"base_signal_long": "BUY",
"nav_basis": "Project NPV7 after-tax C$171.0M (PEA, base-case deck) + C$28.46M PV of the OR Royalties deposit instalments still receivable \u2212 C$24.38M stream give-up (marginal after-tax annuity 5.20x) \u2212 C$12.0M corporate G&A + C$18.0M net cash + C$5.92M warrant proceeds = C$187.00M; \u00f7 236,418,200 FD shares = C$0.7910/sh. Actual P/NAV 0.9103x \u00f7 warranted 0.70x = 1.3004x.",
"gates_retired_this_run": [
"Liquidity/Runway (care-and-maintenance draw at Caribou; build unfunded) \u2014 retired: up to C$96M committed since 14 Apr 2026 against a C$64M PEA capex, and the US$2M debt was eliminated on 11 Aug 2026. Prior state verified verbatim in calibration-CCI.CN-20260804-1338.json."
],
"shares_basic": 212733000,
"shares_fully_diluted": 236418200,
"changes_note": "Signals BUY on all three horizons (prior HOLD/BUY/BUY at C$0.62; price +16.1% to C$0.72). The Short is upgraded because the technical cap's own written release condition was met on 31 Aug. No STRONG BUY \u2014 the Full band blocks amplification. THIS RUN CORRECTS FOUR ERRORS IN MY OWN 4 AUG REPORT: (1) copper spot was stated as ~US$4.02/lb \u2014 that was CPER's ETF SHARE PRICE divided by ten; copper is US$6.46/lb, so spot is ~52% ABOVE the PEA deck, not below it, which inverted the sign of the key variable; (2) 'C$64M build unfunded' (x3) \u2014 up to C$96M has been committed since 14 Apr 2026; (3) analyst coverage recorded as zero \u2014 Ventum initiated 4 Aug 2026; (4) the share count was the pre-11-Aug figure \u2014 basic is 212,733,000, not ~200m. AND IT CORRECTS A FIFTH ERROR MADE IN THIS RUN'S OWN FIRST DRAFT, caught by the independent Layer-2 audit before publication: that draft charged the OR Royalties stream give-up while EXCLUDING the consideration received, which made a C$38.35M cheque from a top-five streamer destroy C$10.5M of equity value. A project NPV nets a USE of funds and credits no SOURCE. Corrected \u2014 together with the offsetting fix that the give-up must be valued on a marginal multiple (5.20x), not the average NPV/margin constant. The valuation basis is now the PEA's own base-case deck (L506) with the 30-50% pre-production construction discount (L587): actual P/NAV 0.910x / warranted 0.70x = 1.30x = FULL. Gate 3 does not fire. Two ladder/state changes the B5 roll-up consumes: short_entry_confirmed False -> True, and analysis_status STAYS 'donatien-pick' (the auto-Stop does not fire \u2014 BUY is live on all three horizons).",
"nav_per_share": 0.791,
"valuation_model": {
"basis": "P/NAV",
"unit": "CAD_m",
"terms": [
{
"id": "stage1_npv",
"label": "PEA project NPV7% after tax",
"sign": "+",
"kind": "asset_pv",
"value": 171.0,
"nets": [
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"tax"
],
"means": "the present value of the Murray Brook and Caribou mine plan at the PEA's own base-case deck, which already subtracts the C$64M of initial capital as a future outflow and is stated after tax"
},
{
"id": "or_stream",
"label": "OR Royalties 20% payable Ag/Au stream give-up",
"sign": "-",
"kind": "giveup",
"value": 24.4,
"means": "the value Canadian Copper permanently forgoes by selling twenty percent of payable silver at twenty percent of spot, valued on a MARGINAL after-tax annuity over the thirteen point two year mine life deferred to first production, not on the average capex-inclusive multiple used for the project. The PEA schedules no payable GOLD, so despite the instrument covering Ag and Au this term is sized on silver alone (783koz/yr); the gold leg is valued at zero and that is a disclosed omission, not an oversight",
"consideration_elsewhere_value": 7.02
},
{
"id": "corp_ga",
"label": "Corporate overhead, present value",
"sign": "-",
"kind": "outflow",
"value": 12.0,
"nets": [
"corporate_ga"
],
"means": "head-office costs that the project-level study does not carry, discounted over the period between today and first production"
},
{
"id": "net_cash",
"label": "Corporate net cash",
"sign": "+",
"kind": "cash",
"value": 18.0,
"means": "cash held at the corporate level after the July and August receipts and the repayment of the two million US dollar debt, rolled forward from the January filing using the reported quarterly loss of roughly one point one million dollars"
},
{
"id": "warrant_proceeds",
"label": "Warrant exercise proceeds",
"sign": "+",
"kind": "dilution_proceeds",
"value": 5.92,
"funds": [
"shares"
],
"means": "the cash that arrives if the 23,685,200 warrants at twenty-five cents are exercised before they expire in November, credited only because the per-share figure divides by the fully diluted count"
},
{
"id": "or_consideration",
"label": "OR Royalties consideration still receivable",
"sign": "+",
"kind": "asset_pv",
"value": 28.5,
"means": "the present value of the thirty one point five million dollars of stream deposit still payable to the company in quarterly instalments across construction, being the cash side of the same transaction whose cost is carried by the stream give-up term",
"consideration_for": "or_stream"
}
],
"no_double_count": "CORRECTED IN ROUND 2 after an independent audit. The round-1 model charged the stream give-up while EXCLUDING the consideration received, on the reasoning that the C$96M package funds the same C$64M capex the PEA already nets. That reasoning was WRONG: a project NPV nets a USE of funds and credits no SOURCE, so crediting the consideration does not count the capex twice \u2014 it recognises an inflow the NPV omits, whose offsetting cost is the give-up already deducted. Verified on a minimal example: NPV 50 with a streamer paying 100 for a stream worth 100 gives equity 50 by cash-flow trace and by NPV+proceeds-giveup, but -50 by the round-1 formula. The round-1 error made a C$38.35M cheque from a top-five streamer DESTROY C$10.5M of equity value, which is the smell test that should have caught it. Checked pairs: stage1_npv NETS initial_capex and no term funds it (the capex is UNSPENT, so unlike a spent-capex case it is correctly not added back); or_stream and or_consideration are the two sides of ONE transaction and are both carried exactly once; warrant_proceeds is credited only against the fully diluted count. Ocean Partners' C$48M debt is EXCLUDED entirely \u2014 its proceeds are offset by repayment plus SOFR+7.75% interest, so crediting the draw without the liability would overstate NAV. INSTRUMENT NOTE: the OR consideration is a stream DEPOSIT, not a simple grant. OR pays 20% of spot in cash on delivery with the remaining 80% credited against the deposit until it is reduced to nil \u2014 i.e. it is repaid IN METAL, which is exactly what the life-of-mine give-up term charges. Inflow credited once, give-up charged once; the arithmetic is unaffected, but the earlier wording 'non-repayable financing proceeds' mis-described the instrument and is corrected here.",
"basis_asymmetry_note": "DIRECTION AND MAGNITUDE, stated because silence reads as 'no asymmetry'. The OR Royalties consideration is credited at contracted nominal value (C$35.48M PV: C$7.02M upfront inside net cash plus C$28.46M receivable) while the stream it buys is charged at the PEA's US$27/oz deck (C$24.38M). Netted, the model books +C$11.10M of value created by an arm's-length financing \u2014 31% of the larger leg \u2014 equivalent to pricing the credit side off an implied silver deck near US$39/oz. Worth 0.082 on the warranted ratio. This is the model's largest single judgement and it is disclosed in \u00a74 and in threshold_fragility: treat the financing as exactly value-neutral and the ratio is 1.3825x, only C$2.2M of NAV below the 1.40x ceiling that caps every horizon at HOLD. The asymmetry is real and defensible (contracted cash is contracted), but it is not free, and a reader is owed the number rather than the reassurance.",
"per_share_cash_add": 5.92,
"inputs": [
{
"id": "financing_basis",
"label": "financing basis asymmetry",
"nav_low": 169.98,
"nav_high": 181.08,
"basis": "The two sides of the OR Royalties transaction are priced on different bases: the consideration is credited at contracted nominal value while the give-up is charged at the PEA's US$27/oz deck. The low end treats the financing as exactly value-neutral, which is the conservative alternative treatment."
},
{
"id": "giveup_multiple",
"label": "marginal give-up multiple",
"nav_low": 172.08,
"nav_high": 181.08,
"basis": "The give-up is an annuity over the 13.2-year mine life deferred 2.5 years to first production; the range spans the after-tax multiple used (5.20x) up to the pre-tax convention (7.12x), which is the defensible span for this discounting choice."
},
{
"id": "corporate_ga",
"label": "corporate overhead",
"nav_low": 181.08,
"nav_high": 193.08,
"basis": "The C$12M overhead figure is an author estimate with no filing behind it; the range spans the central figure down to zero. It cannot move NAV downward, because overhead below zero is not a thing."
}
]
},
"lint": {
"exit": 0,
"assertions": 66,
"errors": 0,
"warnings": 8,
"could_not_run": [
"CCY-PE-SKIPPED",
"FW-GUARDRAIL-SKIP"
],
"at": "2026-09-12T05:49",
"report": "CCI.CN_Signal_v6_20260911_1600.html"
},
"usd_cad_rate": 1.38601,
"usd_cad_rate_asof": "2026-09-11",
"fx_note": "Recorded for verification, but the valuation is FX-INVARIANT by construction: the NPV-per-unit-margin constant K is calibrated so the deck case reproduces the PEA's published C$171M using the same USD/CAD rate that converts the margin, so the rate cancels from both the stream deduction and the spot NPV. Verified numerically at 1.37, 1.38601 and 1.45 \u2014 identical NAV/share to five decimals.",
"relative_strength_vs_spy": 16.2,
"relative_strength_vs_sector": 16.4,
"eps_trailing": -0.02,
"trailing_pe": null,
"eps_pe_na_reason": "Pre-revenue: the quarter ended 30 Apr 2026 reported nil revenue and a C$1,078,609 net loss. eps_trailing is real and negative (-C$0.02); trailing_pe and clean_pe are null because a P/E on negative earnings is not a number, not because the check was dodged. No non-operating income exists to decompose, so the step-7b earnings-quality screen does not apply.",
"quality_confidence": 60,
"valuation_confidence": 58,
"timing_confidence": 60,
"guardrail_note": "Sector guardrail for Materials/Miners is P/NAV >= 1.5x. Actual P/NAV is 0.910x, so the guardrail arm does NOT fire. The band comes from the warranted RATIO (1.30x), which lands in FULL (1.20-1.40) and is BELOW the 1.40x Expensive threshold \u2014 so Gate 3 does not fire and no horizon is capped. The Full band does block amplification to STRONG BUY (L510/L1320). The lint's 8.0x figure is the EV/EBITDA alternative and is inapplicable to a pre-revenue developer.",
"confidence_note": "valuation_confidence is 58 \u2014 the lowest of the three and therefore the one that sets overall_confidence \u2014 because three of the four relative lenses do not resolve on this name, so the Valuation score rests largely on the anchor alone. That is stated in \u00a74 rather than smoothed over.",
"cite_audit": {
"round": 4,
"rows": 17,
"supported": 17,
"not_supported": 0,
"partial": 0,
"census_sha256": "f06acfb50593911ad37d3bdd2dda15aa2ade3f43708d628404cdb419da05ba3c",
"at": "2026-09-11T18:30",
"disposition": "COVERAGE LIMITATION \u2014 read the counts as covering MARKET and PEER figures ONLY. Every row comes from CITE-MARKET or CITE-PEER. The detector has no rule for superlative or ranking claims ('the only permitted plant', 'a top-five streamer'), physical specifications (a 13 km haul) or contract-term claims, so those classes were NOT machine-swept on this report. They were adjudicated by hand against primary sources by the independent Layer-2 auditor, which found the 'only permitted plant' superlative UNSUBSTANTIATED (narrowed to what the source supports, in \u00a73 and \u00a712) and confirmed 'top-five streamer' and the 13 km haul as true but uncited (now cited, and the facts added to the declared source notes). A sweep that skipped a whole class reads identically to a clean sweep, which is why this sits in the field it qualifies rather than in the fix log. Registered as CITE-SUPERLATIVE in data/improvement-debt.json."
},
"threshold_fragility": "Ratio 1.3004, FULL band. NOT ROBUST. It is 13.3 NAV units from the 1.40x edge and 15.6 from 1.20x. Largest single sensitivity: financing basis asymmetry (financing_basis), worth 0.082 on the ratio and closing 83% of the nearer gap, stopping short of crossing it alone. corporate overhead: 0.078, covering 77%. marginal give-up multiple: 0.066, covering 68%. Taken together the declared inputs close 151% of the gap to 1.40x and 77% of the gap to 1.20x. The fragility is ONE-SIDED and points WORSE. Do not claim both adjacent bands sit inside the envelope \u2014 that claim was published once and was false.",
"delta_vs_prior": "vs calibration-CCI.CN-20260804-1338.json. signal_short HOLD -> BUY. quality 71 -> 74. valuation 63 -> 45. timing 56 -> 70. driver 64 -> 70. economic alignment 64 -> 70. price 0.62 -> 0.72. warranted_ratio set to 1.3 (absent in the prior report). val_band fair -> full. short_entry_confirmed false -> true. next_update 2026-08-18 -> 2026-09-25. base target 0.85 -> 0.79. bull target 1.05 -> 1.5. relative strength vs SPY set to 16.2 (absent in the prior report). relative strength vs sector set to 16.4 (absent in the prior report). overall confidence 55 -> 58. probability-weighted target set to 0.866 (absent in the prior report). gates_caution 3 -> 5 (added Valuation Ceiling (Gate 3) \u2014 does NOT fire at a 1.30x warranted ratio (Full band), but the margin is thin and one-sided. On the model as built it sits C$13.3M of NAV below the 1.40x Expensive threshold that caps every horizon at HOLD; treat the OR Royalties financing as exactly value-neutral instead of crediting its consideration and the ratio is 1.38x \u2014 only C$2.2M below it. It also blocks amplification to STRONG BUY.; Dilution/Financing (23,685,200 warrants at C$0.25 expiring 12 Nov 2026 = +11.1% fully diluted; plus up to C$5M optional Ocean equity); Debt service (Ocean Partners C$48M at SOFR+7.75%, 36-month term with a 12-month grace period \u2014 a short tenor against a mine build); Regulatory/Binary (Murray Brook EIA registered 13 Jul 2026, in review; Feasibility Study with DRA Americas due Dec 2026 may revise the C$64M PEA capex); Single-asset, pre-revenue (no operating cash flow; 55% of the C$96M package is optional at the Company's discretion and OR's construction instalments are milestone-conditional); removed Liquidity/Runway (care-and-maintenance draw at Caribou; build unfunded); Dilution/Financing (C$64M capex vs micro-cap balance sheet); Regulatory/Binary (EIA registered 13 Jul, in review, comment closes 21 Aug)). Carried without change: signal_medium, signal_long, entry_conviction, entry_groups_met, exit_action, hard_gate_state, analysis_status, bear target, moat, industry benchmark score, competitive share trajectory, exit_groups_live. NOTE: No change to the signal or the model: BUY/BUY/BUY, ratio 1.30x, Full band, donatien-pick retained.",
"probability_weighted_target": 0.866,
"implied_deck_scale": 0.9735,
"amplification_note": "Stage-2 amplification would otherwise lift the base BUY to STRONG BUY on all three horizons: driver_score 70 is in the 65-79 Tailwind band and economic pressure is Tailwind, so BOTH arms of L1290-1296 are met. It is blocked by the valuation arm alone \u2014 SKILL L510 and L1320 bar a Full- or Expensive-band name from STRONG BUY, and the warranted ratio is 1.30x (>= 1.20x). This is recorded explicitly because a consumer reading the JSON alone would otherwise see driver 70 + Tailwind + BUY and read a contradiction. The block is the valuation band, not a per-horizon driver difference.",
"post_audit_fixes_round1": "BLOCKER 1 model: credited the OR Royalties consideration receivable (PV C$28.5M) alongside the give-up - a project NPV nets a USE of funds and credits no SOURCE; verified on a minimal cash-flow trace. Offsetting fix applied in the same pass: give-up revalued on a MARGINAL after-tax annuity (5.20x) not the average NPV/margin constant, raising it C$17.6M -> C$24.4M. BLOCKER 2/3/5: every published figure now derives from the builder's D[]/RATIO; legacy model_terms[] deleted; decision lock re-frozen (not amended - the change crossed the 1.40 boundary). BLOCKER 4: the SS4 build paragraph is f-stringed from the model incl. the warrant credit. BLOCKER 6: SS6 econ rendered blank on a key mismatch (supplied score/html, renderer reads stance/pressure/conviction/rationale) - fixed. BLOCKER 7: SS13 regenerated from entry_groups_met/entry_conviction. BLOCKER 8: SS14 re-rendered from the final calibration. BLOCKER 9: driver_commodity_trend rebuilt from this run's data - it still carried the US$4.02 CPER error the report apologises for, and is a CARRIED field. M1/M2: threshold_fragility published - the band is NOT robust, both adjacent bands sit inside the assumption envelope. M5: PEA NPV standardised to the primary source's C$171M. M9: implied deck now solved numerically, not typed. M11: SS10 sma50 + levels supplied. NEW CHECK: CITE-MARKET built into preflight_report.py with two fire-proofs drawn from the real CCI.CN fabrication - the census went from 0 rows to 13.",
"audit_route_note": "Round 1: a FRESH general-purpose agent (never a fork) \u2014 The artifact was substantially rebuilt on the anchor (the NAV financing treatment changed, moving the warranted ratio 1.47x -> 1.30x across the 1.40x band boundary and the signal HOLD/HOLD/HOLD -> BUY/BUY/BUY), so report-audit.md L99 routes to a FRESH auditor rather than a continuation.. Verdict FAIL (9 blockers, 11 majors, 8 minors). Round 2: SendMessage to the SAME auditor \u2014 Round 2's findings were prose-sweep defects plus one substantive disclosure correction; the model, the signal chain and the arithmetic were independently reproduced and confirmed by the round-2 auditor. The artifact was PATCHED, not rebuilt, so report-audit.md L51 routes back to the SAME auditor rather than a fresh one.. Verdict FAIL (8 blockers, 9 majors, 5 minors). Round 3: SendMessage to the SAME auditor \u2014 Two small edits plus four sweeps; the model and signal chain were reproduced and confirmed unchanged for the second consecutive round. Patched, not rebuilt, so the same auditor continues.. Verdict FAIL (2 blockers, 5 majors, 3 minors). Round 4: SendMessage to the SAME auditor \u2014 Three small blockers, two of them fixes landing on top of one another. Model and signal chain reproduced and confirmed unchanged for the third consecutive round.. Verdict FAIL (3 blockers, 3 majors, 1 minor).",
"gate3_arms_note": "Gate 3 has four arms; all four are adjudicated here rather than only the Expensive one. (a) Expensive band (>=1.40x warranted): does NOT fire \u2014 1.30x, Full band. (b) Sector guardrail (Materials P/NAV >= 1.5x): does NOT fire \u2014 actual P/NAV 0.910x. (c) Above the analyst target: does NOT fire \u2014 price C$0.72 is below the sole target of C$1.00 (n=1). (d) Own-history decile: CANNOT BE CLEARED, and I am recording that rather than treating silence as a pass. The lens is withheld because the three prior Donatien P/NAV readings were computed on a basis corrected in this report, so ranking against them would manufacture a signal from my own past error. A withheld lens must not silently clear a gate arm \u2014 it will become clearable at the next report, when two clean readings exist.",
"post_audit_fixes_round2": "B1 THE SUBSTANTIVE ONE: the financing disclosure was factually inverted - I claimed silver was 'far below today's level' in April 2026 when OR agreed the consideration. Verified against SI=F monthly closes: April 2026 US$73.53 vs US$65.60 now, i.e. ABOVE. Corrected, and the asymmetry is now DERIVED not typed: OR consideration PV C$35.48M against a give-up charged at C$24.38M books +C$11.1M of value from an arm's-length financing = an implied silver deck near US$39/oz on the credit side = 0.08 on the ratio, four times the 0.02 I typed. B2 threshold_fragility rewritten: it omitted that exact sensitivity. Value-neutral treatment gives ratio 1.3825x - only C$2.2M of NAV below the 1.40x Gate-3 ceiling that caps all three horizons at HOLD. It also wrongly claimed BOTH adjacent bands were in the envelope; the 1.20x side needs NAV +C$15.65M and no listed input supplies it, so the fragility is ONE-SIDED and points at HOLD. Stated. B3 SS6 econ was unterminated in the builder and had swallowed SS7's text - rebuilt. B4 spliced sentence fixed. B5/B6/B7 stale HOLD-era assertions removed from the signal banner, SS5 and the corrections callout. B8 nav_basis regenerated (the one place the derive-everything pass missed). M1/M2 the relative-lens block was deleted when SS4 was rewritten - restored, incl. the analyst cross-check. M3 all FOUR Gate-3 arms now adjudicated, incl. recording that the own-history arm CANNOT be cleared because the lens is withheld. M4 the OR deposit is repaid IN METAL, not 'non-repayable' - corrected. M5 five instalment conditions, not three. M6 gold leg disclosed as valued at zero. M7 C$169M removed. M8 SS8 date. M9 surface-table footnote. m1 m2 fixed.",
"post_audit_fixes_round3": "B1 my own M5 edit had overwritten its neighbouring clause, leaving an orphan fragment mid-phrase after a closed paragraph and silently deleting the substantive line 'Committed is not the same as drawn' - both restored. Same class as B4, introduced by the round that fixed B4. B2 the superseded fragility paragraph was left standing six paragraphs from its own correction, so the report asserted 'both adjacent bands sit inside my assumption envelope' while the calibration recorded that claim as wrong - deleted; the weakest-joint paragraph carries the argument. M1 RENDERER FIX, not a prose fix: resolve_cites walked spec['sections'] only, and changes_box is a TOP-LEVEL key, which is why its markers never resolved. Stripping them was the wrong repair and is reverted - all four citations restored and now resolving. M2 RENDERER FIX: spec.sections.rules.html was read by nothing, so the authored SS12 narrative - the closing verdict and the published STRONG-BUY and downgrade triggers - had never rendered in any round. Now rendered, and the SS12 key contract is asserted so an unread key fails the build (same class as the SS6 blank; swept rather than fixed per-section). M3 gates_caution[0] and SS2 now carry the 1.38x value-neutral figure and the C$2.2M gap - that field feeds the watchlist tooltip and finder-sync. M4 cite_audit now discloses its coverage limitation in terms: all rows are CITE-MARKET/CITE-PEER, superlative, ranking, physical-spec and contract-term classes were NOT machine-swept, and '17 supported / 0 not-supported' must be read as market and peer figures only. M5 the 'only permitted' superlative is narrowed to what the source supports - a fully permitted, past-producing 3,000 tpd plant 13 km from the deposit, cited; top-five streamer and the 13 km haul cited rather than softened. Minor: the 'not three' audit artefact removed from the prose.",
"post_audit_fixes_round4": "A the four-relative-lenses block was deleted a SECOND time \u2014 my round-3 slice to remove the superseded fragility paragraph cut from 'not a robust band' to the Valuation line, and the lens block sat between them. Restored. Same class as the SS6 swallow: slice deletions eating neighbours. B the SS12 narrative un-hidden by the round-3 renderer fix still carried the 'only permitted mill' superlative that round 3 had narrowed out of SS3 \u2014 1,580 characters of prose that had never been audited by anyone, now narrowed to match. C cite_audit.census_sha256 was corrupted by my own shell command zero-padding it to 66 chars; recomputed properly and verified against the census file. M1 the disposition had been dropped because --cite-receipt rebuilt cite_audit wholesale \u2014 restored INTO cite_audit, and claim_census.py now preserves an existing disposition. M2 SS2's gate card and summary callout swept to carry the value-neutral C$2.2M figure alongside the C$13.3M. M3 the declared source notes for pea-2025 and or-close-jul16 now carry the facts their citations point at (the 13 km haul road, the 3,000 tpd plant spec, the verbatim 'global top-5 precious metal streaming company') \u2014 Layer 0.5 sees only the census and the declared notes, so a true claim cited to a note that does not carry it still reads NOT SUPPORTED. Minor: resolve_cites walked a hard-coded ('changes_box',) tuple \u2014 an instance fix wearing a class fix's clothes; it now walks the whole spec except calibration_json.",
"nav_total": 181.08,
"carried_verbatim": [
"competitive_share_trajectory"
],
"carried_verbatim_note": "competitive_share_trajectory carries \"gaining\" unchanged from 4 Aug. Checked this run, not assumed: \u00a73 was rewritten around the Caribou plant ownership and the narrowed permitting claim, and the conclusion is the same \u2014 CCI still holds the district bottleneck. Acknowledged rather than silently carried."
}
Signals BUY on all three horizons (prior HOLD/BUY/BUY at C$0.62; price +16.1% to C$0.72). The Short is upgraded because the technical cap's own written release condition was met on 31 Aug. No STRONG BUY — the Full band blocks amplification. THIS RUN CORRECTS FOUR ERRORS IN MY OWN 4 AUG REPORT: (1) copper spot was stated as ~US$4.02/lb — that was CPER's ETF SHARE PRICE divided by ten; copper is US$6.46/lb, so spot is ~52% ABOVE the PEA deck, not below it, which inverted the sign of the key variable; (2) 'C$64M build unfunded' (x3) — up to C$96M has been committed since 14 Apr 2026; (3) analyst coverage recorded as zero — Ventum initiated 4 Aug 2026; (4) the share count was the pre-11-Aug figure — basic is 212,733,000, not ~200m. AND IT CORRECTS A FIFTH ERROR MADE IN THIS RUN'S OWN FIRST DRAFT, caught by the independent Layer-2 audit before publication: that draft charged the OR Royalties stream give-up while EXCLUDING the consideration received, which made a C$38.35M cheque from a top-five streamer destroy C$10.5M of equity value. A project NPV nets a USE of funds and credits no SOURCE. Corrected — together with the offsetting fix that the give-up must be valued on a marginal multiple (5.20x), not the average NPV/margin constant. The valuation basis is now the PEA's own base-case deck (L506) with the 30-50% pre-production construction discount (L587): actual P/NAV 0.910x / warranted 0.70x = 1.30x = FULL. Gate 3 does not fire. Two ladder/state changes the B5 roll-up consumes: short_entry_confirmed False -> True, and analysis_status STAYS 'donatien-pick' (the auto-Stop does not fire — BUY is live on all three horizons).